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Notes 
“DIVINE” JUSTICE AND THE LACK OF 
SECULAR INTERVENTION:  ABROGATING 
THE CLERGY-COMMUNICANT PRIVILEGE IN 
MANDATORY REPORTING STATUTES TO 
COMBAT CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any 
particular sect may designate as religion.”1 
Imagine two loving parents at the airport, anxiously awaiting the 
return of their sixteen-year-old daughter from a yearlong mission trip to 
the Philippine Islands.  Picture their excitement as they look for their 
young, vivacious daughter to step off the plane from the terminal 
window.  Now imagine their shock when they see the once bright-eyed 
girl walking toward them with dull, lifeless eyes and a sickly physique.  
Envision this weak looking child carrying a newborn infant in her arms.  
The array of emotions these parents undoubtedly experience as a result 
of this unexpected situation is great, but try picturing the amount of 
outrage and devastation they feel when they discover that their church 
leaders lied to them and sent their daughter on this mission trip to 
conceal her pregnancy.  Imagine their feelings of betrayal to learn that 
more than seven revered spiritual leaders had been regularly coaxing 
their daughter into sexual intercourse under the guise of being 
religiously permissive and ethically wise.  Visualize these parents’ anger 
when they learn that the church leaders failed to uphold their promise to 
provide adequate financial support for their daughter while away, 
resulting in her suffering malnutrition and being near death during 
childbirth.  Try conceiving their astonishment and feelings of 
abandonment when the seven errant clergymen and their informed 
superiors are left unpunished and free to prey on other unsuspecting 
children and families.2 
                                                 
1 PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 24 (1962). 
2 This hypothetical situation is based on the case of Rita M. v. Roman Catholic 
Archbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
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Situations like the preceding hypothetical are not unique.  The 
United States is facing a pandemic of child sexual abuse.3  Surprisingly, 
however, only about ten percent of reported cases of sexual abuse on 
minors are alleged to have been perpetrated by a stranger.4  Instead, 
abuse is typically perpetrated by a family member, friend, or other 
known and trusted individual, such as a clergyman.5  Consequently, the 
tragedy and horror of sexual abuse is found not only in the home, but 
also in the church.6 
The government has a strong interest in preventing child abuse in all 
forms, regardless of the perpetrator’s relationship with the victim.7  Yet, 
                                                 
3 National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Sexual Violence: Fact Sheet, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/svfacts.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) [hereinafter 
National Center]; Darkness to Light, Statistics Surrounding Child Sexual Abuse, 
http://www.darkness2light.org/KnowAbout/statistics_2.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) 
[hereinafter Darkness].  Nearly one in four girls and one in six boys are sexually abused 
before the age of eighteen, with the median age being nine.  Darkness, supra.  Fifty-four 
percent of all rapes on women transpire before they reach age eighteen, with twenty-two 
percent of these rapes occurring before age twelve, while seventy-five percent of rapes on 
men take place prior to their eighteenth birthday, with forty-eight percent of these 
occurring before age twelve.  National Center, supra.  Child protective service agencies 
confirmed that approximately two out of every one thousand children in the United States 
experienced sexual assaults in 2003.  Id.  One in five children are sexually solicited over the 
internet.  Darkness, supra.  Nearly seventy percent of all reported sexual assaults, including 
those on adults, occur on children seventeen and younger, and more than twenty percent 
of those children are sexually assaulted before age eight.  Id.  “An estimated . . .  [thirty-
nine] million survivors of childhood sexual abuse exist in America today.”  Id. 
4 Id.  Roughly thirty to forty percent of victims were abused by a family member and 
another fifty percent by a trusted non-relative, thus leaving only ten percent of abuse 
conducted by strangers.  Id.  “In 1997, parents and other caretakers committed one fifth of 
all violent crimes against children seventeen and under.”  Heather Rushing Potter, 
Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation and the Duty to Report Child Abuse, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 
269 (2004-2005).  However, “[a] vast majority of child abuse cases are never reported, and, 
many times, deaths resulting from child abuse are never reported as such.”  Id. 
5 See supra note 4 (reporting how nearly ninety percent of all child sexual abuse crimes 
are perpetrated by an individual known or trusted by the victim). 
6 Secrecy, a lack of reporting, and inadequate record keeping have made ascertaining 
the extent and nature of the sexual abuse impossible.  Ruth Jones, The Extrajudicial 
Resolution of Sexual Abuse Cases: Can the Church be a Resource for Survivors?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 351, 352 (2005).  Roman Catholic Church officials alone received 1,092 allegations of 
sexual abuse on minors in 2004 and 783 in 2005.  Tara Dooley, Fewer Church Abuse Claims 
Found, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 31, 2006, at B3.  Additionally, a recent survey commissioned by 
the United States Conference of Bishops, known as the John Jay Survey, estimated that 
abuse within the Catholic Church affected more than ninety-five percent of dioceses and 
approximately sixty percent of religious communities.  Jones, supra, at 353. 
7 See Darkness, supra note 4 (stating how, given that most perpetrators are recidivistic if 
they are not reported and stopped, the government’s interest in eliminating child sexual 
abuse and punishing those who perpetrate it is undoubtedly compelling).  Of child sex 
offenders, nearly seventy percent have between one and nine victims, and at least twenty 
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despite this concern, the state often hesitates before acting on accusations 
of abuse within religious communities or by religious leaders, partially 
due to the constitutional dictates demanding separation of church and 
state.8  Thus far, the state has been content to abstain from intervening by 
allowing the individual organization to confront the abuse in accordance 
with its own rules and practices.9  Such passivity is socially unacceptable 
and ineffective at resolving child sexual abuse. 
The criminal justice system has begun making changes to 
accommodate sexually abused minors; however, as this Note suggests, 
more aggressive changes are necessary.10  Because cases cannot be tried 
until they are reported and investigated, this Note recommends that 
states universally abrogate the clergy-communicant privilege in relation 
to already existing mandatory reporting statutes in order to ensure that 
all complaints or allegations of indecent sexual acts on children are 
brought to the attention of the appropriate government agency.  Hence, 
Part II of this Note will present the manner by which several religious 
institutions internally handle sexual abuse allegations and will illustrate 
some of the deficiencies within the current criminal justice system.11  Part 
II also provides a discussion of the constitutional restraints on 
government action via the First Amendment, current mandatory 
reporting statutes, and the clergy-communicant privilege.12  Part III will 
                                                                                                             
percent have between ten and forty victims.  Id.  The average serial child sexual abuser may 
have upwards of four hundred victims in his (or her) lifetime.  Id. 
8 See infra Part II.B (discussing Religion Clause jurisprudence). 
9 Constance Frisby Fain & Herbert Fain, Sexual Abuse and the Church, 31 T. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 209, 211 (2006).  “[S]exual abuse by clergypersons has been historically ignored and 
hidden to a great extent . . . .”  Id. 
10 Judges have already begun “alter[ing] time-honored practices to accommodate 
children in court.”  John E. B. Myers, Susan E. Diedrich, Devon Lee, Kelly Fincher & Rachel 
M. Stern, Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse in the United States, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE: HISTORICAL, LEGAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 57 (Jon R. Conte ed., 
2002).  Examples of such accommodations are: the witness chair being turned slightly away 
from the accused, not mandating that a child look directly at the accused when answering 
prosecutor’s questions, giving more discretion to the judge as to whether or not to close the 
proceedings or prohibit courtroom spectators when the child is testifying, granting regular 
breaks for the child when testifying, permitting judges to control the line of questioning so 
as to make questions more comprehensible to the child, allowing the child to be 
accompanied by a “supportive adult[,]” and, in some circumstances, permitting a child to 
“testify via closed-circuit television, outside the physical presence of the accused” (which 
was determined not to be in violation of the defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation 
with the witnesses against him in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)).  Id. at 57-58. 
11 See infra Part II.A (demonstrating how some religious institutions internally approach 
the issue of child sexual abuse and the criminal justice system’s response thereto). 
12 See infra Parts II.B-II.D (discussing the history of Religion Clause jurisprudence, the 
mandatory reporting statute, and the clergy-communicant privilege). 
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then analyze mandatory reporting statutes in relation to Religion Clause 
jurisprudence and the feasibility of abrogating the clergy-communicant 
privilege as a potential government recourse for the sexual abuse 
dilemma in the church.13  Part IV will offer a model mandatory reporting 
statute abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege.14 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The crime of child sexual abuse has infiltrated all places that, in an 
ideal world, would shelter and protect minors—from the homestead to 
the school to the church.15  Innovative measures, such as abrogating the 
clergy-communicant privilege, are necessary so that law enforcement 
agencies can effectively combat the child abuse problem and secure the 
safety of minors.16  Thus, Part II.A first explores some of the internal 
polices practiced by the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of Latter-
Day Saints, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Amish in confronting 
allegations of child abuse.17  Then, Part II.B addresses the history of the 
Religion Clause jurisprudence, looking first at the Free Exercise Clause 
and then the Establishment Clause.18  Next, Part II.C of this Note briefly 
examines the history, purpose, and types of mandatory reporting 
statutes.19  Lastly, Part II.D discusses the clergy-communicant privilege 
and the different approaches states take in the context of criminal 
prosecutions.20 
A. Internal Religious Policies in Regard to Child Abuse Exercised Under the 
Principle of Freedom of Religion and Illustrations of the Government’s 
Responses 
Religious institutions often receive exemptions from generally 
applicable laws.21  Such exemptions are seen as a means to protect 
                                                 
13 See infra Part III (stating that the abrogation of the clergy-communicant privilege is 
socially acceptable and constitutionally viable under the First Amendment). 
14 See infra Part IV (presenting a model mandatory reporting statute abrogating the 
clergy-communicant privilege). 
15 See supra notes 3-4 (presenting statistics illustrating the widespread nature of the child 
sexual abuse epidemic). 
16 See infra Part III.B (discussing the necessity for abrogating the clergy communicant 
privilege as a method of combating child sexual abuse). 
17 See infra Part II.A. 
18 See infra Part II.B. 
19 See infra Part II.C. 
20 See infra Part II.D. 
21 Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation As Legal Exemptions Grow: From Day 
Care Centers to Zoning Laws, Rules Don’t Apply to Faith Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 
(stating “such organizations—from mainline Presbyterian and Methodist churches to 
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religious freedom under the First Amendment.22  However, according to 
some scholars and lawmakers, “separation of church and state is no 
longer the law of the land.”23  While the exemptions that these scholars 
are referring to generally fall under areas of civil concern, religious 
institutions are typically allowed to conduct themselves in accordance 
with the same practices and principles they have used for centuries 
when dealing with such criminal issues as child abuse.24  Ambiguity 
concerning what government actions are constitutionally permissible 
under the Religion Clauses often shields religious institutions from the 
government enacting legislation that would encroach upon an 
institutional practice.25  These internal policies often include methods for 
                                                                                                             
mosques to synagogues to Hindu temples—enjoy an abundance of exemptions from 
regulations and taxes.  And the number is multiplying rapidly.”). 
[S]ince 1989 . . . more than 200 special arrangements, protections or 
exemptions for religious groups or their adherents were tucked in 
Congressional legislation, covering topics ranging from pensions to 
immigration to land use. . . . The special breaks amount to ‘‘a sort of 
religious affirmative action program . . . . 
Id. at 22. 
22 See Henriques, supra note 21, at 22.  “Some legal scholars and judges see the special 
breaks for religious groups as a way to prevent government from infringing on those 
religious freedoms.”  Id.  See generally Employment Div. Dep’t. of Human Res. of Oregon v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that generally applicable, neutral laws can be upheld 
against religious practices without a Free Exercise violation).  See also infra Part II.B 
(discussing the scope of religious freedom under the Religion Clauses). 
23 Henriques, supra note 21, at 22.  “The Court has asserted that the objective of the 
Establishment Clause is total separation [of church and state] while acknowledging that, in 
our complex society, total separation is not possible.”  Patricia Diann Long, Does the Wall 
Still Stand?: Separation of Church and State in the United States, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 755, 755 
(1985).  The “wall” is “a flexible rather than a fixed wall.”  Id.; see also Laurie Messerly, 
Reviving Religious Liberty in America, 8 NEXUS 151, 159 (2003) (referring to the “mythological 
‘wall of separation’ between church and state”) (emphasis added). 
24 B.A. Robinson, Jehovah’s Witnesses (WTS) Policies & Examples of Child Sexual Abuse, 
Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Jan. 23, 2007, http://www.religioustolerance. 
org/witness7.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) [hereinafter WTS Policies] (“Every religious 
institution develops their own policies and regulations concerning accusations of child 
sexual and physical abuse.”).  See also 91 AM. JUR. TRIALS 151 § 3 (2006).  “We, as a culture, 
have historically trusted the churches to handle . . . [sexual abuse] themselves and they 
have coveted their right to do so.”  Id. at § 7. 
25 See infra Part II.B (discussing the Religion Clause jurisprudence).  As the problem of 
child sexual abuse in the religious community becomes more prevalent, it becomes evident 
that the epidemic of child sexual abuse within the church needs to be addressed more by 
the state.  See Christine A. Clark, Religious Accommodation and Criminal Liability, 17 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 559, 580 (1990) (stating that “the danger of violating the establishment clause 
‘cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection 
of values promoted by the right of free exercise.’”) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 221 (1972)); KURLAND, supra note 1, at 22 (“To permit individuals to be excused from 
compliance with the law solely on the basis of religious beliefs is to subject others to 
punishment for failure to subscribe to those same beliefs.”).  Although the government has 
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handling “sins” within their communities, such as child sexual abuse.26  
Part II.A thus explores some internal handling procedures used by only a 
tiny fraction of the different denominations in the United States and how 
the government responds to them.27 
1. The Roman Catholic Church 
As one of the oldest religions in the world, the Catholic Church is 
“not only a religious entity but a secular political force as well.”28  
Because the Church enjoys such a deep and varied history, it has, 
throughout time, developed its own legal system known as The Code of 
Canon Law (“the Code”).29  The Code is the basic source of law in the 
Church.30  The Code specifically forbids child sexual abuse and outlines 
                                                                                                             
a compelling interest in protecting children, this interest must sometimes yield to a higher 
parental right in rearing children.  See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (noting the “primary role 
of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an 
enduring American tradition.”); Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
165-66 (1944) (acknowledging a state’s interest in protecting a child’s welfare but stating 
that the custody and nurture of the child resides first with the parent); Pierce v. Soc’y of the 
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the 
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (finding that while a state has great latitude 
in what it can do to improve quality of life for its citizens, parents have a natural duty and 
fundamental right to care for and educate their children that must be respected).  See also 
Clark, supra, at 580 (discussing a state’s compelling interest in preventing child abuse.) 
26 These institutionally practiced methods often conflict with the social policy of 
protecting children by cloaking community members from government investigations.  
Jones, supra note 6, at 351 (discussing the decades-long culture of secrecy as pertaining to 
sexually abusive church officials). 
We as a people, as a nation, and particularly as a collection of religious 
institutions, have maintained, like the proverbial three monkeys, a self-
protective posture of ‘see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil.’  
Child sexual abuse is routinely explained away, trivialized, or simply 
denied whenever there is a risk of confrontation. 
91 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 24, at § 4 (emphasis added). 
27 See infra Parts II.A.1-II.A.4 (discussing the Catholic Church, The Church of the Latter 
Day Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Amish). 
28 Thomas P. Doyle, Canon Law and the Clergy Sex Abuse Crisis: The Failure From Above, in 
SIN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS: SEXUAL ABUSE BY PRIESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH 25 (2004).  Doyle recounts that the Church throughout its history has served a 
combination of functions from spiritual leader, to military power, to potent political power, 
to an economic force.  Id. at 26. 
29 Id. at 25.  “Canon,” derived from Greek, means “rule” or “straight line.”  Id.  This 
system of self-governance is the oldest continuously functioning legal system in the world 
today.  Id. 
30 Id. 
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clear, detailed procedures for investigating such allegations.31  While the 
Catholic Church has a historically rooted legal system in place to address 
the problem of sexually errant clerics, the canonical system has been 
ineffective at rectifying clergy sexual abuse.32  This failure, however, is 
not associated with the Code itself, but rather with those in charge of its 
implementation.33  The Vatican rarely removes errant priests from active 
ministry, thus perpetuating recidivism.34  Rather than laicize clerics, 
bishops have sent offending clergy to treatment centers and hospitals 
                                                 
31 See id. at 26.  The Code states, “[i]f a cleric has otherwise committed an offense against 
the sixth commandment of the Decalogue [a sexual offense] with force or threats or 
publicly or with a minor below the age of sixteen, the cleric is to be punished with just 
penalties, including dismissal from the clerical state if the case warrants it.”  Id. (quoting 
Canon Law Society of America, THE CODE OF CANON LAW c.1395 (1983)).  Under canon 
law, the most severe penalty for sexual misconduct is the removal of the individual from 
the priesthood.  Jones, supra note 6, at 359.  Additionally, the Code contains provisions for 
establishing a tribunal system which serves as both an internal civil and criminal court for 
the purpose of determining the validity and egregiousness of sex abuse allegations and the 
proper penalty for them.  Doyle, supra note 28, at 26.  Dismissal of clergy members can be 
imposed through one of these canonical trials; however, due to the complexities, this is 
rarely done.  Id. at 27.  Instead, the Pope can, upon request of the cleric, laicize the cleric.  Id.  
The Code does grant the Pope the power to dismiss a cleric against his will (usually upon 
the request of his supervising bishop), but this, too, is an anomaly.  Id.  To laicize an errant 
clergyman means that the Church effectively removes all clerical duties and returns the 
individual to layperson status.  Random House Inc., laicize, http://dictionary.reference. 
com (last visited Aug. 22, 2007). 
32 Doyle, supra note 28, at 28 (stating that the “canonical system has been an abysmal 
failure at dealing with clergy sexual abuse”).  Church leaders made decisions and took 
actions that “placed the interests of the Catholic Church above those of [sexual abuse] 
survivors and children.”  Jones, supra note 6, at 358. 
33 Doyle, supra note 28, at 28.  The Code “becomes trivialized when bishops ignore it or 
apply it dishonestly for self-serving purposes.”  Id.   Bishops and other Church leaders 
were aware of the allegations and instances of sexual abuse, but still “failed to take 
effective action to stop the abusers and to deal compassionately with victims.”  Jones, supra 
note 6, at 352.  Instead, Church officials doubted the veracity of abuse allegations and told 
victims that they had either “misunderstood or misinterpreted a priest’s affection as abuse 
and were wrong for making the report.”  Id. at 358. 
34 Jones, supra note 6, at 352.  The Church failed to “remove abusive priests from the 
ministry and away from children.”  Id. at 359. 
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before returning them to their parishes.35  Additionally, bishops, acting 
under instruction, have relocated clergy to distant dioceses.36 
The result of these common practices is the perpetuation of crimes 
against minors, as discovered in recent years with the highly publicized 
sexual abuse scandals and the criminal justice system’s response to 
them.37  Most criminal cases that have come before the courts have been 
dismissed due to statute of limitation problems, and rarely do such cases 
involve high-level church officials.38  Late in 2004, for example, Bishop 
Thomas L. Dupre became the first Catholic bishop to be indicted for 
sexually abusing a minor; however, hours after the indictment was filed, 
the District Attorney withdrew it, allegedly due to the statute of 
limitations.39  Instead, most abuse victims have sought “justice” against 
                                                 
35 Leslie M. Lothstein, The Relationship Between The Treatment Facilities and the Church 
Hierarchy: Forensic Issues and Future Considerations, in SIN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS: SEXUAL 
ABUSE BY PRIESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 123 (2004).  The Church hoped 
that by sending errant clergy to a variety of different clinics, residential centers, non-
therapeutic monastic enclosures, and hospitals, the sexually deviant behaviors could be 
evaluated and treated without having to dismiss the clergy member.  Id.  After the 
treatment was concluded, the errant clergyman would be returned to his ministerial duties 
and allowed further access to children.  Jones, supra note 6, at 359. 
36 Lothstein, supra note 35, at 123 (suggesting that the relocation of errant clergy occurs 
when scandals within a dioceses are looming, thus allowing the clergy to avoid detection 
among parishioners or identification by their victims).  A 1962 Church document, titled 
“On the Manner of Proceeding in Cases of Solicitation[,]” specifically instructed church 
officials to transfer sexually abusive priests.  91 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 24, at § 3.  The 
document also mandated the destruction of all church documents pertaining to sexual 
abuse allegations lacking foundation and to secret away all evidence pertaining to specific 
abuse allegations.  Id.  In 2002, the Boston Globe uncovered thousands of pages of the 
“Church’s own records to reveal institutional forgiveness of abusive priests, consistent 
indifference to victims, and compelling evidence of a decades-long cover-up by a 
succession of cardinals and their bishops.”  Michael Rezendes, Scandal: The Boston Globe and 
Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church, in SIN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS: SEXUAL ABUSE BY 
PRIESTS AND THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 28, at 1. 
37 See Fain, supra note 9, at 225 (stating, “many courts have been reluctant to impose 
liability on the defendants in these types of cases”). 
38 Marci Hamilton, D.A.’s Clever Tactic in Child Sex Abuse Wars; Bringing, then Dismissing 
Indictment against Bishop, Oct. 9, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/07/hamilton. 
sex.abuse/index.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).  See also, Laura Russell, Note, Pursuing 
Criminal Liability for the Church and its Decision Makers for their Role in Priest Sexual Abuse, 81 
WASH. U. L. Q. 885, 893 (2003) (“To date, no bishop, cardinal, or archdiocese has faced 
criminal charges in connection with the child sex abuse scandal.”). 
39 Hamilton, supra note 38.  According to Hamilton, the prosecutor likely indicted 
Dupre, knowing that the indictment would be withdrawn due to a statute of limitations 
issue, for the purpose of expressing that Dupre committed the heinous crime.  Id.  The facts 
of the indictment alleged that Dupre showed two young boys pornography, proceeded to 
intoxicate them, and then sexually penetrated them over a five-year period with a two-year 
overlap.  Id.  Aware that indictment would be withdrawn, Hamilton suspects that the 
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their perpetrators by means of the civil system, but here, too, many have 
found “justice” elusive.40 
2. The Church of Latter-Day Saints 
The Catholic Church is not alone in establishing and upholding 
internal policies that preserve its own traditions, interests, and 
reputation.41  The Church of Latter-Day Saints, a division of the Mormon 
faith, is divided into several different sects, the two primary ones being 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“LDS”) and The 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“FLDS”).42  
There is a problem of child sexual abuse within each church, but the 
problem is more prevalent in the FLDS due to its continued practice of 
polygamy.43  The FLDS currently practices the “law of placing[,]” which 
                                                                                                             
prosecutor persisted in filing it as a warning to other abusers that “the fact that they belong 
to a religious institution will not insulate them from the criminal law.”  Id. 
40 See, e.g., J.M.V.v. Minnesota Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming dismissal of sexual misconduct lawsuit based on doctrine 
of respondeat superior by deeming plaintiff waived review of the issue on appeal); Doe v. 
South Central Spanish Dist. of the Church of God, 2002 WL 31296620 (Tex. App. Oct. 14, 
2002) (upholding summary judgment for both church and pastor against claims of sexual 
assault by husband and wife); Robertson v. Church of God, Int’l, 978 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App. 
1997) (granting summary judgment for the church because the alleged sexual conduct was 
not performed in any official capacity); Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 232 Cal. 
Rptr. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (granting demurrer to all seven charges brought against the 
church due to either statute of limitations conflicts or failure to state a cause of action). 
41 See infra Parts II.A.2-II.A.4 (presenting examples of internal policies from three other 
religious denominations). 
42 See, e.g., RAY B. WEST, JR., KINGDOM OF THE SAINTS 342 (1957); B.A. Robinson, 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS), Ontario Consultants on 
Religious Tolerance, July 25, 2004, http://www.religioustolerance.org/flds.htm (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2007) [hereinafter FLDS]. 
43 FLDS, supra note 42; USA: Polygamy related abuses in Utah, Women Living Under 
Muslim Laws, Feb. 15, 2002, http://wluml.org/english/actionsfulltxt.shtml?cmd[156]=i-
156-3124 (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) [hereinafter USA: Polygamy].  In 1890, the LDS, in a 
manifesto known as the “Great Accommodation,” suspended indefinitely the practice of 
multiple marriages.  FLDS, supra note 42.  In 1935, the FLDS was founded by a number of 
excommunicated LDS members who resumed the traditional Mormon practice of 
polygamy.  Id.  “Indeed, many fundamentalist Mormons preferred excommunication to 
renouncing polygamy, which they considered central to the church’s teachings.”  CLAUDIA 
LAUPER BUSHMAN & RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN, MORMONS IN AMERICA 102 (1999).  The 
FLDS continued to foster the belief that polygamy was necessary for salvation.  Id. at 92.  
The Church teaches that women are required to be subordinate to their husbands and 
husbands should have at least three wives in order to obtain the highest eternal salvation.  
Laura Blue, The Merry Wives: A Longtime Haven of Polygamy is Feeling the Heat from Police and 
from Within, TIME, Oct. 10, 2005, at 22; John Dougherty, Derail Polygamy’s Money Train, 
PHOENIX NEW TIMES, April 7, 2005, available at http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2005-
04-07/news/derail-polygamy-s-money-train/1. 
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mandates that the prophet of the congregation assign all marriages 
within the community.44  The combination of polygamy and the law of 
placing often results in a shortage of available women within the church 
community.45  The Church counters this by urging older men to take 
child brides and by excommunicating young boys and men to reduce the 
competition for wives.46  The FLDS sanctions incest and child abuse and 
defends the practice as part of its constitutional right under the Religion 
Clauses.47  Additionally, the LDS, while no longer condoning polygamy, 
adheres to a strict practice of “repentance” and “forgiveness” resulting in 
Church leaders returning known sex offenders to the ministry once they 
have formally repented their transgressions.48 
Consequently, the government is increasingly scrutinizing the FLDS, 
but stern criminal penalties for the abuse that results from FLDS policies 
are lacking, as illustrated by the Supreme Court of Utah’s decision in 
State v. Holm.49  In Holm, the court upheld the criminal conviction of 
                                                 
44 Dougherty, supra note 43; Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 
Wikipedia, http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamentalist_Church_of_Jesus_of_ 
Latter_Day_Saints (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Fundamentalist Church].  Under the 
law of placing, “[t]he prophet elects to take and give wives to and from men according to 
their worthiness.”  Fundamentalist Church, supra.  Both the LDS and the FLDS consider 
themselves Christians, “believing in continued revelation[s] from God[;]” consequently, 
they believe that the president of the church, also known as the prophet, seer, and 
revelator, presently “communicates with the deity.”  Bushman, supra note 43, at 119. 
45 FLDS, supra note 42.  The prophet, however, not only assigns available women to men, 
but is also permitted to reassign any man’s current wife and children to another man.  
Dougherty, supra note 43.  In such situations, the new husband often marries both the 
mother and her daughter(s) (if any).  Id. 
46 FLDS, supra note 42.  There are “[r]eported cases . . . in which girls from the ages of 13 
to 16 have been married to older men” indicating a pattern of child marriage, sexual abuse, 
and trafficking (as many girls are being transported to and from Canada for the purpose of 
marriage).  USA: Polygamy, supra note 43. 
Adult women have also described battering, intimidation and sexual 
abuse within polygamous families.  Young women inside these 
communities are vulnerable to coercion by family members and 
religious leaders to enter polygamous marriages.  Trained to obey 
religious teachings and denied any other education, they may see no 
real alternative. 
Id.  In addition, the FDLS has excommunicated over 400 teenage boys, as young as 13, for 
the purpose of reducing the competition with older men for young brides.  Fundamentalist 
Church, supra note 44; see also Blue, supra note 43, at 22. 
47 USA: Polygamy, supra note 43.  FDLS leaders contend that government action against 
polygamy-related abuses is equivalent to religious prosecution in violation of the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  Id. 
48 91 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 24, at § 3. 
49 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).  “Until recently, law enforcement largely 
ignored polygamous groups like the FLDS.”  Andrew Murr, Polygamist on the Lam: A Sect 
Leader Lands on the FBI’s Most Wanted List, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 2006, at 37.  Although 
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Rodney Holm, a devout member of the FLDS, for bigamy and sexual 
conduct with a minor.50  The trial court sentenced Holm to up to five 
years in state prison for each conviction and imposed a $3,000 fine; 
however, the court suspended both in lieu of three years of probation, 
one year in a county jail with work release, and two hundred hours of 
community service.51 
Additionally, FLDS leader Warren Jeffs was recently convicted in 
Utah on two counts of first-degree felony rape, and criminal charges in 
Arizona are pending against him for performing marriages with child 
brides.52  Jeffs’ arrest marks one of the first times in history that a church 
leader has been criminally charged for a sex crime.  Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that his arrest will suppress the prevalence of sexual abuse and 
polygamy within the FLDS church.53 
                                                                                                             
illegal, between 20,000 and 50,000 people live in polygamous families, consecrated as 
“celestial marriages.”  Andrew Murr, Strange Days in Utah, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 2000, at 74.  
“[A]uthorities have long followed an informal policy . . . [of] ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’” in 
regard to these unlawful marriages.  Id. 
50 Holm, 137 P.3d at 730.  Holm was charged with three counts of unlawful sexual 
conduct with a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old and one count of bigamy.  Id. at 731.  The 
jury returned a guilty verdict on all four charges.  Id. 
51 Id. at 732.  The original sentence was suspended, despite Holm taking 16 year-old 
Ruth Stubbs, sister to his first wife, as his third wife at the age of 32.  Id. at 730.  Ruth 
testified at trial that Holm regularly engaged in sexual intercourse with her, and by the 
time she reached the age of majority, she had conceived two children with Holm.  Id. 
52 Associated Press, Jeffs May Retain His Grip Even From Jail, KUTV.com, Aug. 29, 2006, 
available at http://kutv.com/local/local_story_241230306.html [hereinafter Jeffs].  Prior to his arrest, 
Jeffs had been a fugitive for more than two years due to his placement on the FBI’s Most 
Wanted List.  Id.  The felony sex crimes were based in part on Jeffs’ orchestrating the 
marriages between underage girls and older men.  Id.  Jeffs was arrested after a routine 
traffic stop because an officer could not identify his temporary tags.  Brooke Adams & Lisa 
Rosetta, FDLS Leader Jeffs Captured; Future of Leadership Cloudy, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, 
Aug. 30, 2006.  In September 2007, Jeffs’ was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony 
rape as an accomplice for his role in forcing an unwilling 14-year-old girl to marry her 19-
year-old cousin.  Nancy Perkins, Resignation: Jeffs has dropped FLDS position, DESERT 
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 6, 2007.  Jeffs has also been indicted by a federal grand jury in Salt 
Lake City, Utah on a charge of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution as a result of his time 
on the FBI’s most wanted list.  Id. 
53 See Jeffs, supra note 52; Adams & Rosetta, supra note 52.  On November 20, 2007, after 
being sentenced to two terms of five-years-to-life, Jeffs formally resigned as president of 
the FLDS church.  Perkins, supra note 52.  While some members of the FLDS church have 
begun to waiver in their convictions, many more members of the FLDS church are offering 
their complete support to Jeffs and vocalizing their disapproval of local law enforcement 
officers for imprisoning such a holy man.  Ben Winslow, FLDS sect may splinter now that Jeffs 
is in prison, DESERT MORNING NEWS, Dec. 2, 2007.  As a prophet of the FLDS church, Jeffs’ 
followers are not likely to abandon him or the faith because of the arrest unless they feel he 
has violated his own FDLS faith.  Adams & Rosetta, supra note 52. 
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3. Jehovah’s Witnesses 
The Jehovah’s Witnesses church, also known as the Watchtower 
Society (“WTS”), is no stranger to sexual abuse of children either.54  In 
recent years, abuse scandals and alleged cover-ups have been uncovered 
within the WTS.55  Similar to the Catholic Church, the WTS takes a stance 
that condemns such acts while simultaneously adhering to a “child 
protection policy” that seemingly protects pedophiles.56  When 
investigating an allegation of abuse on the part of a WTS member, the 
Church follows a biblical standard requiring either “confession on the 
part of the alleged perpetrator, or [t]he testimony of at least two 
witnesses to a single case of abuse, or [t]he testimony of one witness to 
abuse, followed by testimony of a second witness to another instance of 
abuse.”57  As a result of this practice, the Church rarely prosecutes 
reported cases of sexual abuse.58 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., B.A. Robinson, Jehovah’s Witnesses (WTS) Handling of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 
Ontario Consultants on Religious Toleration, Sept. 3, 2002, available at 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/witness7.htm [hereinafter WTS Handling]; Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and Child Protection, Jehovah’s Witnesses Office of Public Information, 
http://www.jw-media.org/region/global/english/backgrounders/e_molestation.htm 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Office of Public Information].  The WTS was 
founded in 1931 by Charles Taze Russell, who denied the deity of Jesus Christ.  HERBERT 
KERN, HOW TO RESPOND TO THE JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES 7 (1977).  Instead, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses hold that Jesus was first an angel, then for thirty-three years he roamed earth as 
a man and, upon death, once more resumed his position as an angel.  Id. at 22.  The WTS 
relies on the Bible and its own study thereof as set fort in its Watchtower Publications as its 
only sources of inspiration.  Id. at 8.  WTS leaders believe that they are “God’s channel of 
communication” and that salvation resides only within the Society.  Id. 
55 WTS Policies, supra note 24. 
56 Office of Public Information, supra note 54; Jehovah’s Witnesses: Child Abuse Policy, 
Panorama Forum, July 12, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/ 
live_forums/2124808.stm (last visited Aug. 22, 2007).  The WTS has stated on its official 
website, “[c]hild abuse is abhorrent to us. . . . Even one abused child is one too many.”  
Office of Public Information, supra note 54.  See also infra note 57 and accompanying text 
(illustrating how pedophiles are protected). 
57 WTS Handling, supra note 54.  According to WTS officials, the two witness requirement 
to substantiate an accusation of child abuse is based on Scripture.  Office of Public 
Information, supra note 54.  Specifically, the requirement follows the teachings in the Bible 
that say, “[n]o single witness should rise up against a man respecting any error or any 
sin . . . At the mouth of the two witnesses or at the mouth of three witnesses the matter 
should stand good.”  Deuteronomy 19:15. 
58 WTS Handling, supra note 54.  Because few sexual assaults are witnessed, little proof 
beyond the witness’s own accusations can be obtained.  Id.  In this common scenario, WTS 
elders explain to the victim that the Church must view the accused as an innocent person 
and leave the question of his guilt in God’s hands.  Id.  Regardless, in states that require 
mandatory reporting of child abuse crimes and include religious clergy within the scope of 
the statute, elders are expected to report even uncorroborated allegations.  Id.  However, if 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 [2008], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss3/4
2008] Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege 861 
In the rare instance that an allegation is corroborated by multiple 
witnesses or the accused admits guilt, then the member is 
disfellowshipped.59  However, if the perpetrator can convince WTS 
elders that he is truly repentant, then he may be permitted to stay within 
the church, but will be relieved of all former responsibilities and will be 
ineligible to resume holding a responsible job within the congregation 
for at least twenty years.60  Even so, WTS officials admit that there are 
exceptions to the general “punishment” for known but repentant sex 
offenders, based on the individual’s record of service to the Church.61  
For example, in October of 2000, Ronald Broadard, a Bible study teacher 
and son of a Jehovah’s Witness church elder, was arrested for sexually 
abusing a then ten-year-old girl over the course of two years during 
Bible study.62  One year later, the charges were dismissed because 
Broadard was found incompetent to stand trial; however, church elders, 
including Broadard’s father, decided merely to “reprove” him, thus 
allowing him to keep his title and responsibilities within the church.63  
Comparable exceptions and policies of forgiveness also exist within 
smaller, socially isolated religious communities, such as the Amish.64 
                                                                                                             
a state does not have a mandatory reporting statute, the WTS church’s policy is to keep the 
matter secret and instead try to handle the problem within the organization.  Id. 
59 See ANDREW HOLDEN, JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: PORTRAIT OF A CONTEMPORARY 
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT 32 (2002).  Disfellowship is the equivalent of being excommunicated 
in the Catholic Church.  WTS Policies, supra note 24.  The Governing Body of the Society 
deals with minor offenses through a series of meetings known as “[c]ounselling.”  HOLDEN, 
supra, at 77.  Disfellowship, therefore, is the ultimate sanction against a Witness.  Id. at 79.  
Because “absolution from sin is not in any way regarded as a sacrament or even a form of 
spiritual healing[] [but] [r]ather . . . something that must be earned as part of the formal 
procedure for reinstatement,” the process of shunning and disfellowship are necessary for 
protecting both the sanctity of the community as well as the salvation of the sinner.  Id. at 
80. 
60 See, e.g., WTS Handling, supra note 54; Office of Public Information, supra note 54. 
61 Office of Public Information, supra note 54.  “Anyone in a responsible position who is 
guilty of child abuse would be removed from his responsibilities without hesitation.”  Id.  
However, “[i]n a few instances, individuals guilty of an act of child abuse have been 
appointed to positions within the congregation if their conduct has been otherwise 
exemplary for decades.”  Id. 
62 Kathleen Burge, Suit Charges Church Coverup: Jehovah’s Witness Group is Blamed in 
Abuse of Girl, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 2003, at B1. 
63 Id.  In January 2003, a civil lawsuit was filed against the Jehovah’s Witnesses by the 
then-14-year-old victim and her parents alleging that the church covered up her sexual 
abuse by a Bible study teacher and discouraged them from notifying police officials.  Id.  
The girl’s mother stated that the church elders appeared to “coddle” the abuser, while they 
“socially ostracized” her for notifying law enforcement and pressing criminal charges.  Id. 
64 See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing some of the internal policies within the Amish 
community). 
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4. The Amish 
Child sexual abuse affects all denominations, from mainline religions 
to minority religious sects such as the Old Order Amish.65  The Amish 
descended from sixteenth century Anabaptists and adhere to a fairly 
strict policy of rejecting the modern society around them.66  The Amish 
abide by the Ordnung, both for their district and their church.67  The 
Ordnung governs all aspects of a community member’s life—from dress 
codes, to prohibitions on modern conveniences such as television, cars, 
and radios, to when and how a member can be admitted into the 
church.68  The Ordnung also addresses what to do when major 
transgressions, such as fornication and child abuse, are discovered.69 
                                                 
65 DONALD B. KRAYBILL & CARL F. BOWMAN, ON THE BACKROAD TO HEAVEN 12 (2001).  
The Amish “have high religious ideals, but they are not perfect.  Greed, gossip, envy, 
deceit, and revenge sometimes lift their ugly faces.  And there are occasional cases of 
alcohol abuse, sexual abuse, and domestic violence as well.  Despite their outward cloak of 
righteousness, these people are people.”  Id.  Like other people, the Amish, too, “forget, 
rebel, experiment, and for a variety of reasons, stray into deviance.”  DONALD B. KRAYBILL, 
THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE 111 (1989). 
66 KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 1, 4-7.  The Amish are the most conservative of 
the Anabaptist churches, rejecting electricity, telephones, and industrialized farming 
equipment.  Id. at 6-7.  Other Anabaptist churches include the Mennonite, the Hutterites, 
and the Brethren.  Id. at 1.  Although the Amish appear “to be pressed from the same 
cultural mold,” there are many differences in Amish practices among the many settlements 
across the country.  Id. at 107.  These differences are camouflaged by at least ten badges of 
identity shared by most Old Order Amish.  Id. at 105-06.  These badges are: 
(1) horse-and-buggy transportation, (2) the use of horses and mules for 
fieldwork, (3) plain dress in many variations, (4) a beard and shaven 
upper lip for men, (5) a prayer cap for women, (6) the Pennsylvania 
German dialect, (7) worship in homes, (8) eighth-grade private 
schooling, (9) the rejection of electricity from public utility lines, and 
(10) taboos on the ownership of televisions and computers. 
Id.; see also JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 83-84 (4th ed. 1993). 
67 HOSTETLER, supra note 66, at 82-83; KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 15.  The 
word Ordnung is German for “rules and discipline.”  Id.  These rules, while typically oral in 
nature, are the “blueprint for an orderly way of life” and necessary for the welfare of the 
church-community.  HOSTETLER, supra note 66, at 82. 
68 KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 106.  “The Ordnung clarifies what is considered 
worldly and sinful, for to be worldly is to be lost.”  HOSTETLER, supra note 66, at 83.  While 
some of the provisions in the Ordnung are derived directly from the Bible, many are 
supported by the sole reasoning that to do otherwise would be worldly and thus unholy.  
Id.  All members of an Amish community are aware of the Ordnung for their congregation, 
irrespective of it primarily being oral and unwritten in form.  Id. at 82. 
69 See KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 109.  Amish tradition has established the 
ritual of confession as a means of punishing such deviant behavior as well as reuniting the 
errant member with the community.  KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 111.  There are four levels 
to the ritual of confession based on the seriousness of the offense.  Id.  Level one, identified 
as the “private” level, entails a church leader personally visiting with the offender.  Id.  
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Because the Amish church community favors living in isolation from 
the outside world, members prefer to deal with such “sins” themselves 
through a process of public confession, shunning, and, in worst case 
scenarios, excommunication.70  If violators of the Ordnung publicly 
confess their errant ways and demonstrate true repentance during their 
shunning, the church will restore them in the community with full 
forgiveness, while excommunicating those who do not.71  While this 
practice of confession, shunning, and forgiveness may work as a sound 
internal remedy for a dress code violation or a member caught watching 
television, when it comes to adequately managing problems of sexual 
abuse, the system allows ample opportunity for recidivism.72  By 
allowing even the most serious perpetrators of sexual abuse to confess to 
the Church and publicly apologize, the Amish community essentially 
permits those individuals to continue to interact freely with the 
community members, including its youth.73 
The criminal justice system has been reluctant to impose itself on the 
Amish community, despite the circulation of child abuse reports for 
more than twenty years, because “the Amish do not want protection 
                                                                                                             
Levels two and three both involve public confession, the former through “sitting” and the 
later through “kneeling.”  Id. at 111-12.  Finally, level four entails a six-week ban, during 
which time the individual is severed from all social contact, thus providing ample time for 
reflection on the seriousness of the transgression before returning to the community and 
publicly confessing via kneeling.  Id. at 112-13. 
70 KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 109.  Violations of the Ordnung are confessed 
publicly in a “members meeting.”  Id.  The purpose of the public confessions is to diminish 
self-will, remind members of the “supreme value of submission[,]” and restore “the 
wayward into the community of faith.”  Id.  Those transgressors who refuse to publicly 
confess their sins, or those who confess extremely terrible sins such as child abuse, can 
receive a six-week-long probation in which they are shunned by the rest of the community.  
Id.  The practice of shunning is often called Meidung.  HOSTETLER, supra note 66, at 85; 
KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 115.  Expelled or excommunicated people are ostracized and 
shunned for life or until they repent, publicly confess their sins, and are reinstated into the 
church.  KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 116.  However, the Amish, like most denominations, 
are “reluctant to dismiss deviant members[;]” thus, excommunication will only be imposed 
after the offender is fully warned and encouraged to confess and the community 
unanimously votes to do so.  Id. at 114; Hostetler, supra note 66, at 85 (stating that the 
Amish follow Matthew 18:15-17 when excommunicating a member). 
71 KRAYBILL & BOWMAN, supra note 65, at 109-10.  Even years after an offense, 
excommunicated members can be fully restored into the church and forgiven if they return 
to publicly confess their sins.  Id. at 110; KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 115. 
72 See generally Nadya Labi, The Gentle People, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan. 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2005/feature_labi_janfeb05.msp. 
73 Id.; see also KRAYBILL, supra note 65, at 113 (“Those who confess their sin and promise 
to ‘work with the church’ are reinstated into it.”). 
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from the state - for religious reasons.”74  When the government does 
intervene, secular justice is minimal.75  For example, in 2002, a 
Philadelphia county judge wanted to incarcerate a convicted sex 
offender for life for assaulting two Amish boys, but instead accepted a 
plea agreement giving the recidivistic former Amish man eighteen to 
thirty-six months in a state prison followed by five years of probation.76  
In another instance, where an Amish girl contacted Children and Youth 
Services (“CYS”) to report that she was being molested and raped by her 
two older brothers and severely beaten and abused by her parents, the 
family evaded justice.77  CYS interviewed the girl, but upon meeting 
resistance from her parents and community members, the girl was 
essentially left in the hands of her family.78  Prosecutors never charged 
her parents or oldest brother with abuse, while a judge allowed the 
                                                 
74 Kathleen Brady Shea, Judge Accepts Plea to Protect Amish Boys, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 
Dec. 5, 2002, at B03.  The Amish tend to make a prosecutor’s job more difficult by refusing 
to report offenses and go to court, even when doing so is in their best interest.  Id.; see also 
Associated Press, Ex-Amish Women Tell of Repeated Sex Assaults: “I Wasn’t Going to be 
Tortured Anymore,” One Says, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, July 19, 2004, at B1 [hereinafter 
Women Tell]. 
75 Compare Associated Press, Judge Sentences Amish Man to Five Years in Sex Case, 
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Oct. 31, 2001, at 9A (discussing a five-year prison sentence given 
to a 69-year-old Amish man for eleven counts of rape and gross sexual imposition when he 
sexually assaulted two female minors), with  Duane Schuman, Man to Get Sentence in Sex-
Act Plea, Amish Children Targeted, Prosecutors Say, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, May 1, 
2001, at 1A (discussing a possible sixty-eight-year prison sentence for a non-Amish man 
who abducted and sexually assaulted both male and female Amish children in his van as 
they traveled home from school). 
76 Shea, supra note 74.  The lighter sentence is attributed in part to the victims’ preference 
not to testify at trial due the Amish avoidance of the legal system and the sensitivity of the 
charges.  Id.  The former Amish man had two prior convictions for indecent assault and 
corruption of minors—one in 1991 and another in 1993.  Id.  The victims in all instances 
were Amish boys ranging between ten and thirteen years of age.  Id.  His attorney and 
friend described him as a sixty-nine-year-old man who has “made a couple of mistakes” in 
his life and needs help, not punishment.  Id. 
77 Labi, supra note 72.  The abuse began at the age of eleven when her nineteen-year-old 
brother sexually molested her.  Id.  When he left the household, her seventeen-year-old 
brother started raping her.  Id.  After she turned thirteen, and fearing pregnancy, she began 
to fight against the repeated attacks, causing her brother to place significant pressure on 
her chest, constricting her ability to breathe during the assaults.  Id.  Her father not only 
ignored this sibling abuse, but continually would beat her with a piece of wood out at the 
family woodpile when she violated even the most minor of Amish offenses, such as 
coloring pictures with markers.  Id. 
78 Labi, supra note 72.  Because the girl had done the unspeakable by seeking help from 
outsiders for a family problem, her mother took her to an Amish dentist and, after the girl 
had received a Novocain shot in each gum, proceeded to have all of her teeth removed as 
punishment for talking.  Id.  The girl bled for three days and was shunned by her family 
throughout the ordeal.  Id.  CYS discovered the abuse in its continued investigation, but 
neither the dentist nor the mother was criminally charged.  Id. 
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younger brother to remain under Amish supervision, provided he stay 
away from the girl.79 
As a pluralistic society, the task falls to the government to juggle the 
competing interests of hundreds of varying religious denominations 
with those of the nation as a whole in accordance with the goals of the 
First Amendment.80  The religious institutions presented here are but a 
sampling of the array of religious ethos found within the borders of the 
United States.81  In keeping with the tradition of pluralism, the Supreme 
Court has struggled with answering the difficult questions presented 
under the Religion Clauses; however, in addressing the pandemic of 
child sexual abuse within the religious community, courts should find 
fewer First Amendment violations while permitting more government 
                                                 
79 See id.  At age nineteen, having received no relief from either her church or the state, 
she left both her family and the church.  Women Tell, supra note 74. 
80 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“The First Amendment has a dual 
aspect.  It not only ‘forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the 
practice of any form of worship’ but also ‘safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of 
religion.’”).  In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart commented upon the duty of the 
Court in the face of internal First Amendment tensions.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
417 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).  Justice Stewart said, “[w]ith all respect, I think it is the 
Court’s duty to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between the Free Exercise 
Clause of the Constitution and the Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Court.”  Id. 
at 416. 
81 See, e.g., McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 
(2005); County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 
U.S. 573 (1989).  Justice Souter, in his majority opinion in McCreary, noted: 
It is true that the Framers lived at a time when our national religious 
diversity was neither as robust nor as well recognized as it is now.  
They may not have foreseen the variety of religions for which this 
Nation would eventually provide a home.  They surely could not have 
predicted new religions, some of them born in this country.  But they 
did know that line-drawing between religions is an enterprise that, 
once begun, has no logical stopping point.  They worried that “the 
same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all 
other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of 
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects.”  The Religion Clauses, as a 
result, protect adherents of all religions, as well as those who believe in 
no religion at all. 
McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 844 (internal citations omitted).  In addition, Justice Blackmun 
commented that: 
This Nation is heir to a history and tradition of religious diversity that 
dates from the settlement of the North American Continent.  Sectarian 
differences among various Christian denominations were central to the 
origins of our Republic.  Since then, adherents of religions too 
numerous to name have made the United States their home, as have 
those whose beliefs expressly exclude religion. 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589. 
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interventions into religious practices for the purpose of uncovering, 
investigating, and prosecuting abuse perpetrators.82  The fact that the 
criminal justice system has seemingly turned a blind eye on the problem 
that is plaguing the church community, through its slow or tempered 
responses to known instances of sexual abuse, suggests that more 
stringent government acts, such as the abrogation of the clergy-
communicant privilege, need to be implemented.83  Inaction not only 
perpetuates a growing dilemma, but it serves as a form of reverse 
discrimination under the Religion Clauses by conferring added benefits 
to those within a religious community.84  Such preferential treatment on 
the basis of religion conflicts with the dictates of the Religion Clauses by 
seemingly endorsing religion over non-religion.85 
B. History of Religion Clause Jurisprudence 
Historically, because of their entwinement, the First Amendment’s 
Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause86 commonly clash.87  
                                                 
82 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (stating, “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not 
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter 
to ill health or death.”). 
83 Fain, supra note 9, at 224-25.  “More sexual misconduct cases involving various 
denominations have been decided by the courts during the 1990s and 2000s, and it is 
clear . . . that the judiciary is often reluctant to impose liability on the church regardless of 
how bizarre the events engendering the claims.”  Id.  Often, “the church will approach the 
law enforcement agency investigating the allegations and assure them that this sex crime is 
an ‘isolated incident’ and that the public interest will be best served by removing the 
offender from the parish and sending them to treatment.”  91 AM. JUR. TRIALS, supra note 
24, at § 8.  In addition, given the time that passes between the actual abuse and the victim’s 
report and the age or frailty of the victim, churches and law enforcement officials give in to 
the temptation of disbelieving the veracity of such malicious crimes.  Jones, supra note 6, at 
358.  As a result, the victims of child sexual abuse have obtained limited assistance from the 
criminal justice system.  Fain, supra note 9, at 215.  “Many feel that the judiciary is not 
acting forcefully or expeditiously enough in resolving the issue of clergy misconduct.”  Id.  
There is, however, hope that “persistent media focus addressing the issue and exposing the 
clergy perpetrators of sexual abuse should exert pressure on the courts, as well as the 
churches, to do whatever is necessary to alter ministerial behavior.”  Id. at 225. 
84 See KURLAND, supra note 25. 
85 See id., supra note 1, at 18 (“[T]he proper construction of the religion clauses of the first 
amendment is that the freedom and separation clauses should be read as a single precept 
that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these 
clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a 
burden.”). 
86 U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .”). 
87 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1454 (2d ed. 2005) (citing Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)).  Chemerinsky poses this hypothetical as an 
illustration of the inherent tension that exists between the Religion Clauses: if the 
government provides ministers for those in military service through the use of taxpayer 
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Turning to the Framers’ intent often yields little relief for the dilemma of 
“proper” Religion Clause application.88  Even so, with religious diversity 
continually increasing, the United States Supreme Court has not shied 
away from interpreting and applying the Religion Clauses, albeit 
inconsistently doing so.89  Consequently, it is helpful to review each 
clause separately, beginning with the Free Exercise Clause.90 
1. The Free Exercise Clause 
The Supreme Court first analyzed the Free Exercise Clause in 
Reynolds v. United States, when it examined whether to criminalize 
religiously sanctioned polygamy.91  While acknowledging that the 
                                                                                                             
dollars, the government is arguably establishing religion; however, if the government 
refuses to provide any religious ministers to the armed forces, then it is arguably denying 
the troops free exercise of religion.  Id.  Resolving this tension proves difficult because clear 
meaning and applicability of the Religion Clauses have continually eluded the courts since 
their inception in 1791.  Id. at 1455.  Determining a neutral method of applying the Religion 
Clauses is frustrated by the fact that both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause are “cast in absolute terms[,]” and if either is “expanded to a logical extreme[,]” 
they would clash with each other.  Id. at 1454 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 
668-69 (1970)). 
88 Id. at 1454-55.  The Court’s struggle in determining how best to apply the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment is perpetuated by the Framer’s differing views.  There are 
at least three distinct schools of thought which influenced the drafters 
of the Bill of Rights: first, the evangelical view (associated primarily 
with Roger Williams) that “worldly corruptions . . . might consume the 
churches if sturdy fences against the wilderness were not maintained”; 
second, the Jeffersonian view that the church should be walled off 
from the state in order to safeguard secular interests (public and 
private) “against ecclesiastical depredations and incursions”; and, 
third, the Madisonian view that religious and secular interests alike 
would be advanced best by diffusing and decentralizing power so as 
to assure competition among sects rather than dominance by any one. 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158-59 (2d ed. 1988).  The problem 
with turning to the Framers for interpretation of the Religion Clauses “is compounded by 
the enormous changes” the country has undergone since the adoption of the First 
Amendment.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1455. 
89 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. 
REV. 807, 825-26 (1999).  “It is plain that there is wide variety in American religious taste.”  
Ballard, 322 U.S. at 94 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589. 
90 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause). 
91 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878).  Reynolds, the plaintiff, was a member of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, commonly known as the Mormon Church.  Id.  He testified 
that: 
it was the duty of male members of said Church . . . to practice 
polygamy . . . that this duty was enjoined by different books which the 
members of said Church believed to be of divine origin, and among 
others the Holy Bible, and also that the members of the Church 
believed that the practice of polygamy was directly enjoined upon the 
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government cannot prohibit the free exercise of religion, the Court held 
that the government could make particular actions illegal.92  The Court 
emphasized that to allow all religious practices to go unchecked would 
be to allow individual autonomy to overthrow the laws of the land.93  
The Reynolds holding essentially protects religious beliefs while 
simultaneously placing compelling social concerns above particular 
religious practices.94 
Almost a century later, the Supreme Court, in Sherbert v. Verner,95 
addressed the Free Exercise Clause again, applying the traditional strict 
scrutiny test to all laws burdening religious freedom.96  The South 
Carolina statute at issue did not withstand strict scrutiny because it 
unconstitutionally denied unemployment benefits in violation of the 
Religion Clauses.97  The Court held that the government could not 
                                                                                                             
male members thereof by the Almighty God . . . that the failing or 
refusing to practice polygamy by such male members of said Church, 
when circumstances would admit, would be punished . . .  [by] 
damnation in the life to come. 
Id.  Reynolds went on to say that he had received permission from his church’s authorities 
to enter into the polygamous relationship.  Id. 
92 Id. at 166.  While laws “cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they 
may with practices.”  Id.  The Court stated that “there never has been a time in any State of 
the Union when polygamy has not been an offense against society . . . .”  Id. at 165.  The 
First Amendment’s guarantee of free religion could not possibly be intended to “prohibit 
legislation in respect to this most important feature of social life.”  Id. 
93 Id. at 166-67 (reasoning that unchecked religious practices would “make the professed 
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect . . . permit every 
citizen to become a law unto himself”). 
94 See Marc James Ayers, Law and Religion Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith Survives: Supreme Court Finds Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Unconstitutional, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193 (1997).  “Reasoning that the Constitution 
protects religious beliefs but not necessarily religious practices, the Court placed great 
importance on the concerns of society as a whole over and against the religious activities of 
the few.”  Id. 
95 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
96 See generally id. at 398.  Strict scrutiny, one of three general standards used by the 
courts to evaluate the constitutionality of particular government acts, requires proof of a 
compelling government interest.  See, e.g., id. at 406-07; Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.  Additionally, 
the standard requires that the government prove that the means used to achieve its 
professed interest are narrowly tailored—specifically, that they are the least restrictive 
alternative.  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07; Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. 
97 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410.  But see id. at 414-15 (Stewart, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
if the case had been determined under the Establishment Clause, the denial of 
unemployment benefits would have been constitutional).  Appellant was a member of the 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church which observes the Sabbath Day on Saturdays.  Id. at 399.  
When her employer changed the work week for all shifts to include Saturdays, appellant 
refused to work the sixth day due to “conscientious scruples.”  Id.  As a result, she was 
dismissed.  Id.  After several unsuccessful attempts at finding employment that did not 
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substantially burden an individual’s religious practices without first 
having a compelling interest specifically tailored not to penalize 
particular religious beliefs.98 
Neither Reynolds nor Sherbert have been formally overruled, yet the 
Court steered away from both precedents when it established the current 
standard for free exercise claims in Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.99  The Smith Court reviewed 
Oregon’s drug use laws under the Free Exercise Clause and determined 
                                                                                                             
require Saturday labor, appellant applied for unemployment compensation, and was 
denied.  Id. at 401. 
98 Id. at 402 (stating that the government cannot “compel affirmation of a repugnant 
belief nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold 
religious views abhorrent to the authorities”) (internal citations omitted).  The Court 
reaffirmed Reynolds by acknowledging that “one’s religious convictions [are] not totally 
free from legislative restrictions.”  Id. at 403.  However, it limited government restrictions 
on religious practices to those acts that “pose[] some substantial threat to public safety, 
peace or order.”  Id.  This holding marked a shift in First Amendment jurisprudence from 
Reynolds by providing more protection to the individual.  Ayers, supra note 94, at 193.  
“After Sherbert, the crucial determination would now be whether the action taken by the 
government substantially burdened the exercise of one’s religious practices and whether 
the governmental interest asserted was compelling enough to justify the burden.”  Id. 
99 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Congress attempted twice to negate the Smith test.  CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 87, at 1477-78.  Congress’ first attempt to override the Smith standard was by 
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in 1993.  Id.  The RFRA 
specifically sought to restore Sherbert’s strict scrutiny test.  Eugene Gressman, The Necessary 
and Proper Downfall of the RFRA, 2 Nexus J. Op. 73, 76 (1997).  This Act, however, was 
deemed unconstitutional by the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  The 
RFRA failed because “a logical consequence . . . would be that the states would have to 
provide exemptions for every possible religious conflict” and “the litigation costs 
associated with such a burden, combined with the diminished power of the state to govern 
effectively and with uniformity” were too vast.  Ayers, supra note 94, at 196.  By 
invalidating the RFRA, the Court reinforced the principle that only the judiciary retains the 
power to interpret the Constitution.  Gressman, supra, at 73-74 (noting that the “RFRA 
represent[ed] an unprecedented effort by Congress to execute one of the core functions of 
the Court, the delicate function of interpreting the Constitution and applying that 
interpretation to specific cases and controversies”).  Congress’s second attempt came under 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2002 (“RLUIPA”).  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1478.  There was much debate over the constitutionality of 
RLUIPA, and at least three courts have held the Act as unconstitutional in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003); Kilaab Al 
Ghashiyah (Khan) v. Dep’t of Corrections of State of Wisconsin, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. 
Wis. 2003); Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003).  But see Coronel v. Paul, 
316 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Ariz. 2004) (upholding the validity of RLUIPA).  However, in 2005, 
the Supreme Court, revisiting one such Sixth Circuit test case involving inmates at the Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction facility, finally determined that RLUIPA did 
not constitute an Establishment Clause violation because “it alleviates exceptional 
government-created burdens on private religious exercise.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 
709, 720 (2005). 
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that the Sherbert test has never been used to invalidate a law.100  Instead 
of applying Sherbert’s strict scrutiny test, the Court recognized a new 
standard for Free Exercise Clause cases known as the “neutral, generally 
applicable law” test.101  The Court noted that an individual’s beliefs have 
never been an excuse for noncompliance with a valid law the State 
possessed authority to create.102  Rather, only in situations that implicate 
the First Amendment in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections may the Court invalidate a neutral, generally applicable law 
under the Free Exercise Clause.103 
                                                 
100 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85 (“Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life 
beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require 
exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law.”).  The Court went on to suggest that 
the Sherbert test be deemed inapplicable to such free exercise challenges.  Id.  The Court 
implied that society would be “courting anarchy” by requiring a compelling government 
interest before validating a law that encroaches upon some individual’s professed beliefs.  
Id. at 888.  “To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the 
law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is 
‘compelling’—permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto himself,’—
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.”  Id. at 884-85 (quoting, in 
part, Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167) (internal citations omitted).  In this case, plaintiffs were 
Native Americans and members of the Native American Church, which required the 
ingestion of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug derived from a plant called Lophophora 
williamsii Lemaire, during certain religious ceremonies.  Id. at 874.  Oregon law prohibited 
the possession of a controlled substance except when the drug was prescribed for 
medicinal use.  Id.  Under the law, peyote was a Schedule I narcotic and its possession was 
considered a Class B felony.  Id.  Plaintiffs were employees of a private drug rehabilitation 
facility but were terminated when their peyote use was discovered.  Id.  The lawsuit ensued 
when plaintiffs were denied unemployment benefits due to their use of peyote for 
ceremonial purposes.  Id. 
101 Id. at 881.  The Court further stated that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability 
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”  Id. at 879 (quoting, in part, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) 
(Stevens, J., concurring)). 
102 Id.  The Court, reasoning that allowing exemptions to generally applicable laws for 
every conceivable religious claim would make governing inefficacious, held that, despite 
potentially rendering the practice of someone’s religion impossible, a neutral, generally 
applicable law will not be subjected to strict scrutiny standards.  See Ayers, supra note 94, at 
194.  “The Smith majority distinguished Sherbert by finding that the strict scrutiny balancing 
test is appropriate when a state already has a system of individual exemptions in place, but 
that general, facially neutral prohibitions will not require a compelling governmental 
interest.”  Id. 
103 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.  The Court, in dicta, proposed an “exception to its neutral law 
of general applicability rule: the ‘hybrid rights’ exception. . . . Essentially, the exception 
suggests that courts should apply heightened judicial scrutiny when a case involves a free 
exercise component along with another fundamental right.”  Christopher R. Pudelski, The 
Constitutional Fate of Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a 
Post-Smith World, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 720-21 (2004).  See also Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters 
of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a law mandating 
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The inconsistency among courts that attempt to identify a First 
Amendment violation as pertaining to the Free Exercise Clause, 
demonstrates the challenges courts face when assessing the 
constitutionality of government actions.104  The process, moreover, is 
further complicated by the Establishment Clause.105 
2. The Establishment Clause 
Establishment Clause issues are often determined based on one of 
three mainline approaches the Court utilizes in analyzing the relation 
between the government and religion.106  As a result, there is vast 
inconsistency in the manner in which the Court has interpreted different 
government acts under the Establishment Clause.107  For example, in 
                                                                                                             
attendance in public schools as violating both the Free Exercise Clause and parents’ right to 
rear their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory 
education laws as pertaining to the Amish due to the combination of the free exercise of 
religion and the parental right to raise a child). 
104 See McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 882 
(2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Reasonable minds can disagree about how to apply the 
Religion Clauses in a given case.  But the goal of the Clauses is clear: to carry out the 
Founders’ plan of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic 
society.”). 
105 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the entwinement between the 
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause and tension it causes). 
106 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1486; see Tribe, supra note 88.  The three main 
competing Establishment Clause theories are the strict separation theory, the neutrality 
theory, and the accommodation theory.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1486-89.  Strict 
separationists firmly believe that government and religion should, as their name suggests, 
be separated as much and to the greatest extent possible in order to protect the religious 
liberty under the Free Exercise Clause.  Id. at 1486.  Neutrality supporters take the stance 
that government “cannot favor religion over secularism or one religion over others.”  Id. at 
1487.  Finally, accomodationists suggest that the Establishment Clause should be 
interpreted as recognizing religion’s importance and the need of accommodating its 
presence in government.  Id. at 1489.  The Court is frequently composed of adherents of all 
three theories, thus making it near impossible to predict the outcome of a particular case.  
Id. at 1486. 
107 Hamilton, supra note 89, at 824-25 (“The Supreme Court’s doctrine in the 
Establishment Clause arena has been treated to more internal and external criticism for its 
lack of consistency, perhaps, than any other constitutional doctrine.”).  See also John H. 
Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 
72 CAL. L. REV. 847, 847 (1984) (calling for a “more encompassing and clearer view of both 
of the religion clauses of the first amendment and also of the relation between the religion 
clauses and other provisions of the Constitution”); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of 
the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (stating “[O]ur Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray . . . .”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) 
(suggesting that in all Establishment Clause cases, the Court must “reconcile the 
inescapable tension between the objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the 
church or the state upon the other, and the realty that . . . total separation of the two is not 
possible”). 
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Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court established a test to evaluate laws and 
actions under the Religion Clauses that has been haphazardly 
followed.108 
The Court in Lemon admitted that identifying a violation of the 
Establishment Clause is difficult because, in most cases, a particular law 
does not propose to establish a state religion directly, but rather has the 
potential to serve as the impetus for doing so in the future.109  To placate 
these fears, the Court instituted a three-pronged test for determining the 
constitutional validity of laws under the Establishment Clause.110  While 
acknowledging that some relationship between government and religion 
is unavoidable, the Court stated that political division along religious 
lines had to be avoided, and the test was meant to help attain that goal.111 
                                                 
108 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 1499. The future of the 
Lemon test is unknown.  Id.  There is much criticism surrounding the Lemon test, claiming it 
“has proven unwieldy and has led to inconsistent results.”  Long, supra note 23, at 774.  As 
such, inferences may be drawn from recent Court decisions that the Court is slowly moving 
towards an abandonment of the Lemon test.  Id.; see also McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 900 
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (stating, “[a]s bad as the Lemon test is, it is worse for the fact that, since 
its inception, its seemingly simple mandates have been manipulated to fit whatever result 
the Court aimed to achieve.”). 
109 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.  “A given law might not establish a state religion but 
nevertheless be one ‘respecting’ that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such 
establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.”  Id.  Two statutory provisions were 
at issue in Lemon.  Id. at 106.  One was a Pennsylvania statute providing financial support to 
private elementary and secondary schools via reimbursement for the costs of teacher 
salaries, textbooks, and other materials used in secular subjects.  Id. at 606-07.  The other 
was a Rhode Island statute that directly paid fifteen percent of private elementary school 
teachers’ salaries.  Id. at 607.  The opinion held that both types of subsidies to parochial 
schools were unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause.  Id. at 625.  The Court reasoned that the “Constitution decrees that religion must be 
a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and 
that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.”  Id. 
110 Id. at 612-13.  The three prongs of the Lemon Test are: (1) that the statute “have a 
secular legislative purpose[;]” (2) that its primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit 
religion; and (3) that it does “not foster an ‘excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”  Id. (quoting, in part, Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).  Excessive entanglement is 
determined by examining the character and purposes of the benefiting institutions, the 
nature of the state aid, and the relationship between the state and the religious institution 
as a result.  Id. at 615. 
111 Id. at 622.  “[P]olitical division along religious lines was one of the principal evils 
against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.”  Id.  The Court identified 
three additional evils the Establishment Clause alone was enacted to prevent and 
constructed the Lemon test as a method of countering the realization of those evils.  Id. at 
612 (identifying the three evils to be “sponsorship, financial support, and active 
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity”) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668). 
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After the creation of the Lemon test, the Court heard numerous cases 
challenging the constitutionality of a wide range of issues under the 
Establishment Clause.112  The outcomes of those cases, however, were 
less uniform than expected due to the inconsistent application of the 
Lemon test by the Court.113  For instance, Lynch v. Donnelly114 and County 
of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter115 
involved similar religious issues but resulted in different outcomes.116 
                                                 
112 For examples of conflicting application of the Lemon test, see generally Texas Monthly, 
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Corp. of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 
(1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Serv. for the 
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Bd. of Tr. of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Aguilar v. 
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1984); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Stone v. Graham, 449 
U.S. 39 (1980); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); 
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v. Comm. 
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., 
Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).  For similar cases where the Lemon test was 
not applied at all, see generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 
456 U.S. 228 (1982); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
113 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005).  The Van Orden court explained that: 
just two years after Lemon was decided, we noted that the factors 
identified in Lemon serve as ‘no more than helpful signposts.’  Many of 
our recent cases simply have not applied the Lemon test.  Others have 
applied it only after concluding that the challenged practice was 
invalid under a different Establishment Clause test. 
Id. (quoting, in part, Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741) (internal citations omitted).  See, e.g., Good News 
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (holding that a public school could not 
deny a Christian club use of the facility for a meeting place after school hours because a 
modified heckler’s veto, “in which a group’s religious activity can be proscribed on the 
basis of what the youngest members of the audience might misperceive,” is not employed 
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the 
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (holding that because the Establishment 
Clause “does not compel the exclusion of religious groups from government benefits 
programs that are generally available to a broad class of participants,” a student-run 
religious organization could not be denied university funding to print a newspaper); 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Cent. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) (holding 
that allowing a religious institution to use public school property to show a film series 
dealing with child-rearing and family issues would not violate the Establishment Clause 
under the Lemon test); see also supra note 108 (addressing the unwieldy nature of the Lemon 
test and the Court’s potential abandonment of it). 
114 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
115 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
116 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.  The question posed in the Lynch case was whether a 
municipality’s use of a crèche as an element in its public Christmas display was in violation 
of the Establishment Clause.  Id.  Similarly, the issue arising in Allegheny concerned two 
different holiday displays—the first utilizing a crèche and the second a menorah.  See 
generally Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573. 
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In Lynch, the Court addressed the Lemon test but stated that “no 
fixed, per se rule can be framed.”117  Instead, taking an accommodationist 
approach, it reasoned that the Constitution mandated not merely 
tolerance of but also non-hostile accommodation of all religions.118  
Consequently, the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not 
prohibit a municipality from including a crèche in its Christmas 
display.119  Several years later, however, in contrast to the Lynch decision, 
the Allegheny Court followed the endorsement analysis outlined in 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion to Lynch and concluded that the 
city’s use of the crèche was a violation of the Establishment Clause, 
though it upheld the legality of the menorah.120  Thus, the Allegheny 
                                                 
117 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678. 
The line between permissible relationships and those barred by the 
Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due process can 
be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test . . . . 
 In the line-drawing process we have often found it useful to 
inquire whether the challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose, 
whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, 
and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with 
religion.  But, we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be 
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area. 
Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted). 
118 Id. at 673 (“Indeed, we have observed, such hostility would bring us into ‘war with 
our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s guaranty of the free exercise 
of religion.’”) (quoting People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Ed. of Sch., 333 
U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948)); see also supra note 106 (discussing the three primary competing 
theories of Establishment Clause analysis). 
119 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670-71.  The city displayed the crèche, or Nativity scene, for more 
than 40 years, and was situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization.  Id.  As per 
Christian tradition, the display consisted of figurines depicting the infant Jesus Christ, 
Mary, Joseph, several angels, shepherds, three kings, and some animals.  Id.  The city 
displayed the crèche in conjunction with other traditional holiday symbols such as: a Santa 
Claus house, reindeer and a Santa sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, 
colored lights, cutout figures of clowns and elephants, and a large banner that read 
“Seasons Greetings.”  Id.  The city had purchased all of the decorations at a taxpayer cost of 
$1365.  Id.  Based on these facts, the Court concluded that inclusion of the crèche was not 
expressly advocating a particular religious message and only served a secular purpose.  Id. 
at 680-81.  But see id. at 690-91 (O’Connor, J. concurring) (“The purpose prong of the Lemon 
test . . . . is not satisfied . . . by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however 
dominated by religious purposes . . . . The proper inquiry . . . is whether the government 
intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.”). 
120 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579.  The Nativity scene was organized by the Holy Name 
Society, a Roman Catholic group.  Id.  It represented the manger in Bethlehem shortly after 
the birth of Jesus as described in the Bible, and included all of the traditional characters.  Id. 
at 580.  In addition, the wooden manger had as its crest, an angel carrying a banner that 
proclaimed “Gloria in Excelsis Deo” meaning “Glory to God in the highest.”  Id. at 580-81.  
Unlike in Lynch, no Santa Claus, reindeer, or other figurines appeared near the Nativity.  Id.  
The Chanukah menorah was owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but was maintained and 
stored by the city.  Id. at 587.  In contrast to the Nativity, the menorah was displayed along 
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holding effectively clarified that “government’s use of religious 
symbolism” would be “unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing 
religious beliefs.”121 
As illustrated by the Lynch and Allegheny decisions, a consistent legal 
analysis of Establishment Clause challenges is impossible, because such 
challenges are wrought with important and sensitive complications.122  
Nevertheless, the Court has interpreted history and politics enough to 
give the Establishment Clause some shape, even if it “is precious 
little . . . on which we can hang our hats.”123  The shape of the 
                                                                                                             
side several large, fully decorated Christmas trees and a sign titled “Salute to Liberty[,]” 
which bore the mayor’s name.  Id. at 581-82.  The liberty sign read, “During this holiday 
season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty.  Let these festive lights remind us that we are 
the keepers of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.”  Id. at 582.  The Nativity 
scene was placed on the Grand Staircase located inside the county’s courthouse while the 
Chanukah menorah was displayed just outside the City-County building.  Id. at 578.  
Unable to find sufficient guidance under the Lynch opinion, the Court applied Justice 
O’Conner’s endorsement test.  Id. at 595; see supra note 119 (discussing the endorsement 
test).  The Court interpreted the Nativity scene to be an effective endorsement of “a 
patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ,” while dismissing 
the menorah as a non-sanctified object and symbol of a cultural holiday ranking relatively 
low in religious significance in the Jewish community.  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 584, 586-87, 
601.  Chanukah was viewed as having a “socially heightened status” which reflected its 
“cultural or secular dimension” as opposed to Christmas, which could be seen as the 
holiest of Christian holidays.  Id. at 587. 
121 Id. at 597. 
122 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is inconsistently applied to cases needing 
adjudication); see also supra note 106 (addressing the difficulty in obtaining consistent court 
holdings pertaining to the Religion Clauses).  Some scholars, however, have suggested that 
this lack of consistency in Establishment Clause cases is highly beneficial, because “church 
and state ever will reach for an increase in power (either alone or together) . . . [and] [r]ote 
application of bright-line rules to similar factual skeletons would hand church and state a 
too easily manipulable regime.”  Hamilton, supra note 89, at 825-26.  Both church and state 
can change the balance of power in an infinitely creative number of ways; therefore, having 
predictable standards for Religion Clause analysis should never be the Court’s goal.  Id. at 
825.  Demanding consistency and predictability in Religion Clause jurisprudence distracts 
from the more pressing question of proper allocation of power between state and religion.  
Id. at 826. 
123 Id. at 822; see also Mansfield, supra note 107, at 904 (referring to the Court’s Religion 
Clause decisions as a “nearly impenetrable cloud of words and ‘tests’”).  The Court has 
clarified the Establishment Clause to mean this much: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force 
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, 
for church attendance or non-attendance.  No tax in any amount, large 
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Establishment Clause is concrete enough to support the government’s 
extension of existing investigatory tools, such as mandatory reporting 
statutes, into the realm of religion in order to combat child sexual 
abuse.124 
C. Mandatory Reporting Statutes 
Reporting statutes are one type of investigative tool implemented by 
the states to aid in the difficult task of prosecuting sexual abuse.125  
Because government intervention and prosecution of child sexual abuse 
crimes is made possible only by first discovering the need to act,126 states 
                                                                                                             
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion.  Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 591 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Edu. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 
(1947)).  In addition, it has been noted that the Religion Clauses embody the formerly 
radical idea that “[f]ree people are entitled to free and diverse thoughts, which government 
ought neither to constrain nor to direct.”  McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of 
Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 881-82 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
124 See infra Part II.C (discussing mandatory reporting statutes use as an investigatory 
tool); Part III.A (demonstrating the constitutional feasibility of including clergy members 
within the scope of mandatory reporting statutes). 
125 See Myers, Diedrich, Lee, Fincher & Stern, supra note 10, at 58 (discussing the difficulty 
in proving child sexual abuse in court).  Apart from the challenge of identifying instances 
of sexual offenses, the nature of the crime itself is wrought with evidentiary obstacles.  
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (“Child abuse is one of the most difficult 
crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the 
victim.”).  In addition to lack of witnesses, in some instances the child victim is 
incompetent to testify on his or her behalf.  Myers, Diedrich, Lee, Fincher & Stern, supra 
note 10, at 58.  The child is often too young or too frightened to effectively testify.  Id.  
Moreover, “[t]he problems of ineffective child testimony and lack of eyewitnesses are 
compounded by the paucity of medical evidence in most child sexual abuse cases.”  Id.  
Merely acknowledging these evidentiary obstacles is insufficient; thus, judges have begun 
adjusting time-honored courtroom practices to better accommodate children.  Id. at 57; see 
also supra note 10 (providing examples of such accommodations made thus far by courts). 
126  “[I]ntervention is not possible unless there is first detection.”  Ashley Jackson, The 
Collision of Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 74 UMKC L. REV. 
1057, 1065 (2006).  Mandatory reporting statutes increase the likelihood of obtaining helpful 
information that will lead to criminal prosecution.  Pudelski, supra note 103, at 736.  A 
Massachusetts Attorney General report in 2003 blamed the state’s inability to prosecute 
more child abuse perpetrators on weak reporting statutes.  Id. at 714; Office of the Attorney 
General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The Sexual Abuse of Children in the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of Boston 73 (2003), http://www.ago.state.ma.us/archdiocese.pdf. (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2007).  Child abuse is not easily detectable by law enforcement on its own 
due to the inexperience, fears, and vulnerability of the victims and their failure to report 
the abuse.  Jackson, supra, at 1065 (citing “the age and vulnerability of the young victims 
who would refrain from reporting abuse” as a major source of detection difficulties). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 [2008], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss3/4
2008] Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege 877 
fashioned mandatory reporting statutes “for the purpose of detecting 
and eradicating child abuse.”127 
The call for reporting statutes began in the early 1960s and included 
disclosure primarily by physicians and other medical practitioners.128  By 
1967, all fifty states had adopted some form of a statute mandating 
reports of known or suspected instances of abuse to law enforcement 
officials.129  Over the years, the statutes expanded so as to include more 
professionals likely to encounter child abuse.130 
                                                 
127 Andrew A. Beerworth, Treating Spiritual and Legal Counselors Differently: Mandatory 
Reporting Laws and the Limitations of Current Free Exercise Doctrine, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 73, 103 (2004).  The primary purpose behind the implementation of mandatory 
reporting statutes initially was the protection of children.  See Pudelski, supra note 103, at 
706-07 (stating reporting requirements were a response to the public concern of child 
abuse); Raymond C. O’Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise: 
Mandating that Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1, 21-22 (1991).  Based on the 
language of the statutes, it is apparent that: 
reporting requirements are intended to initiate preventative measures 
by proper authorities to guard against future abuse.  In addition to 
providing safeguards for children, these reporting statutes are aimed 
at protecting the integrity of the family unit.  It follows, then, that 
reporting provisions are designed to ensure that children can develop 
normally through growth in a proper mental, physical and emotional 
atmosphere. 
O’Brien & Flannery, supra, at 22. 
128 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare published the first model 
reporting statute in 1963, requiring physicians to report any suspected cases of child abuse 
under penalty of misdemeanor for failing to do so.  See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 126, at 1065; 
Potter, supra note 4, at 270. 
129 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 126, at 1065-66; Pudelski, supra note 103, at 706; Lawrence 
R. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder Abuse: An Inappropriate, 
Ineffective and Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults, 16 FAM. L.Q. 69, 75 (1982-83) (all 
providing accounts of the historical development of child abuse reporting statutes in the 
United States).  Today, all fifty states, together with the District of Columbia and the Virgin 
Islands, have implemented some form of a statute requiring instances of child abuse to be 
reported to various authorities.  Danny R. Veilleux, Validity, Construction, and Application of 
State Statute Requiring Doctor or Other Person to Report Child Abuse, 73 A.L.R.4th 782 (1989); 
Beerworth, supra note 127, at 98.  For most state reporting statutes, see the following: Ala. 
Code § 26-14-3 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 
(West 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 (West 2006); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-11166 
(West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-304 (West 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101(b) 
(2006); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 16, § 903 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (2006); Ga. Code. Ann. 
§ 74-111 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1619 (2006); 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-11 (West 2006); IOWA CODE § 232.69 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 620.030 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 122, § 4011 (West 2006); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704 (West 2006); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 2006); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 43-21-353 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.115 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 
(West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.220 (2006); N.H. REV. 
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Common mandatory reporting statutes contain two types of 
provisions, “provisions that apply to certain individuals and permissive 
reporting provisions that apply to everyone.”131  The statutes typically 
provide immunity from suit for reporting as well as threaten both civil 
and criminal liability for failing to do so.132  However, as a result of the 
growing number of abuse scandals, a few states have added 
amendments to strengthen their reporting statutes.133 
In an attempt to improve the effectiveness of the reporting statutes, 
some states have added clergy to the list of those professionals required 
to disclose information covered under the statute.134  The inclusion of 
                                                                                                             
STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2006); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW 
§ 413 (McKinney 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2151.42.1 (LexisNexis 2006); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-
3 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3 (2006); 
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 37-1-403 (West 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (2006); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 63.1-248.3 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 
(2006); WIS. STAT. § 48.981(2) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (West 2006). 
130 See Jackson, supra note 126, at 1066.  Professionals typically included within the scope 
of the reporting statute are: teachers, law enforcement officials, social workers, physicians, 
therapists, and guidance counselors.  Id.  Reporting statutes have also been expanded to 
provide further protections against neglect, sexual abuse, and physical, mental, and 
emotional abuse.  Pudelski, supra note 103, at 707. 
131 Potter, supra note 4, at 270. 
132 Potter, supra note 4, at 270.  See also Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976).  Flood 
was a hallmark decision that provided the necessary force to give life to the reporting 
statutes.  Jackson, supra note 126, at 1066.  The Flood court held that physicians could be 
liable for negligence in civil cases for failing to report suspected instances of child abuse to 
the proper law enforcement agencies.  Flood, 551 P.2d at 392. 
133 Pudelski, supra note 103, at 713-14, nn.78-81.  These amendments include: (1) 
extending or eliminating the statute of limitations for torts and sexual crimes; (2) increasing 
the penalties, both civil and criminal, for child abuse; and (3) creating new crimes such as 
the crime of “recklessly endangering children.”  Id. at 713-14.  Nevertheless, for the vast 
majority of states, the substance of their mandatory reporting statutes has remained 
unaltered.  Id.; see also infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of 
mandatory reporting statutes to include clergy members). 
134 Pudelski, supra note 103, at 713, n.79.  Inclusion of clergy members under the scope of 
mandatory reporting statutes has been met with much resistance.  See generally Chad 
Horner, Beyond the Confines of the Confessional: The Priest-Penitent Privilege in a Diverse 
Society, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 697, 730 (1997); Beerworth, supra note 127, at 106-07; Jackson, 
supra note 126, at 1062; Michael Keel, Law and Religion Collide Again: The Priest-Penitent 
Privilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 682-83 (1998).  The main 
contentions opponents have against mandating clergy to report abuse and abrogating the 
clergy-communicant privilege are that to do so would constitute a Free Exercise Clause 
violation, would deter parishioners from seeking spiritual guidance or confession, would 
ultimately result in an increase in sexual abuse, would inhibit congregants from cleansing 
their souls, would hinder their ability to obtain eternal salvation, would impede upon 
individual privacy rights, and would result in a slippery slope of government intrusion.  
Horner, supra; Beerworth, supra note 127, at 106-07; Jackson, supra note 126, at 1062; Keel, 
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clergy members in the scope of reporting statutes calls into question the 
applicability of the clergy-communicant privilege.135  As such, child 
abuse reporting statutes fall within one of three general categories: (1) 
those that specifically abrogate the clergy-communicant privilege in 
cases pertaining to suspected child abuse; (2) those that include clergy in 
a catch-all provision requiring “any person” to report; and (3) those that 
preserve the clergy-communicant privilege by affirmatively exempting 
members of the clergy from reporting.136 
Given that one of the most challenging obstacles to prosecuting child 
abuse is discovering its existence, and given that clergy members are in a 
unique position to obtain such information, mandatory reporting 
statutes that call for a suspension of the clergy-communicant privilege 
increase the likelihood of controlling the pandemic of child abuse.137 
                                                                                                             
supra; see also infra Part III.B (addressing and dispelling each of these arguments against 
abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege in the context of mandatory reporting 
statutes). 
135 See O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 127, at 26-30.  Forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia identify the clergy-communicant privilege within their evidence laws.  Id. at 29.  
The privilege protecting communications between a clergy member and a congregant has 
been described as absolute.  81 AM. JUR. 2D WITNESSES § 493 (2006).  “Notwithstanding the 
distinction between a privilege from testifying about confidential communications and a 
privilege from reporting them, twenty-five states have reporting statutes that include the 
clergy.”  O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 127, at 29.  The form varies as to how clergy are 
included in the statute, such as: specifically mandating clergy report; implying that they do 
so; abrogating all privileges thus by default applying it to clergy; or simply abrogating the 
clergy-communicant privilege.  Id. at 29-30 n.148; see also infra Part II.D (discussing the 
history of the clergy-communicant privilege). 
136 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 126, at 1066; Beerworth, supra note 127, at 99.  States 
maintaining the clergy-communicant privilege in full include: Alaska, Arkansas; Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New 
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Vermont.  Beerworth, 
supra note 127, at 99 n.171-72.  States that simply include clergy members among the other 
listed professionals with a duty to report are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, and Texas.  Id. at 99 n.173.  Finally, states that utilize a catchall phrase, such 
as “any person[,]” to include clergy members are: Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Id. at 99 n.174. 
137 Pudelski, supra note 103, at 736 (“[O]ne large obstacle to preventing abuse is the 
limited ability of the state to discover abuse in the first place.  Consequently, because clergy 
members are in unique positions to receive such information, they appear to be one of the 
state’s most important resources to combat abuse.”).  State interests in prosecuting sexual 
offenders are advanced through the use of mandatory reporting statutes.  Id.  Mandatory 
reporting statutes: 
compel citizens, under the threat of punishment, to notify the state of 
any alleged abuse.  They create a link between child welfare services 
and families of victims so that the social programs in place can work 
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D. The Clergy-Communicant Privilege 
The clergy-communicant privilege did not exist at common law; 
rather, it was an evidentiary invention of both state and federal 
governments.138  The privilege was recognized initially, through dicta, by 
the Supreme Court in 1875, but was not officially recommended to 
Congress for codification until 1972.139  Congress rejected the Court’s 
suggestion to implement a specific evidentiary provision pertaining to 
the clergy-communicant privilege, but instead adopted a rule which 
created a more general and flexible provision that could be applied to all 
testimonial privileges.140  Nevertheless, every state and federal 
jurisdiction recognizes the privilege.141 
                                                                                                             
with families and authorities to prevent additional abuse.  In this way, 
“[m]andatory reporting laws play a central role in the child protection 
system, serving as the point of intersection among outlets of children’s 
services, including medical care, mental health, education, and social 
services.” 
Id. at 707 (quoting, in part, SETH KALICHMAN, MANDATORY REPORTING OF SUSPECTED CHILD 
ABUSE 139 (American Psychological Association 2d ed. 1999)). 
138 See Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708 (noting that the clergy-communicant privilege did 
not exist at common law).  The clergy-communicant privilege is a rule of evidence, codified 
federally as Rule 501.  Keel, supra note 134, at 683-84; see infra notes 139-40 and 
accompanying text.  Other commonly used terms in referencing the clergy-communicant 
privilege are: “clergyman-penitent” privilege, “clergy-confider” privilege, “cleric-
congregant” privilege, “priest-penitent” privilege, and “ministerial” privilege.  DAVID M. 
GREENWALD, EDWARD F. MALONE & ROBERT R. STAUFFER, The Clergy Communications 
Privilege, 1 Testimonial Privileges § 6:1, § 6:1 n.1 (2006). 
139 See Pudelski, supra note 103, at 709-10.  In 1875, the Court, via dicta, acknowledged the 
existence of certain evidentiary privileges in Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) 
(“[S]uits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the 
confessional, or those between husband and wife, or of communication by a client to his 
counsel for professional advice, or of a patient to his physician for a similar purpose.”).  In 
1972, the Supreme Court proposed and approved a version of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence containing a specific provision for the clergy-communicant privilege.  Pudelski, 
supra, at 710.  This provision was known as proposed Rule 506.  Id.  Congress never enacted 
proposed Rule 506 but rather adopted Rule 501, “which makes the common law the 
starting point in determining whether the court should recognize the priest-penitent 
privilege.”  Jackson, supra note 126, at 1061. 
140 Pudelski, supra note 103, at 710.  Federal Evidentiary Rule 501 states: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States 
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, 
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be 
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be 
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and 
experience.  However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to 
an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule 
of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or 
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While official acknowledgment of the clergy-communicant privilege 
is relatively new, the privilege can trace its origins to biblical times and 
the creation of the Catholic Seal of Confession.142  The Seal, as 
incorporated in the Code of Canon Law, makes it a crime for a priest to 
reveal any information obtained during confession.143  The penalty under 
the Code for betraying a penitent’s secret is typically 
excommunication.144  There are no exceptions to the Seal; thus, all 
                                                                                                             
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with 
State law. 
FED. R. EVID. 501.  In contrast, the Supreme Court’s proposed Rule 506 first laid out 
definitions for both “clergyman” and “confidential:” 
(a) As used in this rule: (1) A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi, 
or other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an 
individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him.  
(2) A communication is “confidential” if made privately and not 
intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in 
furtherance of the purpose of the communication. 
FED. R. EVID. 506 (not enacted).  The Court then proceeded to suggest that “[a] person has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential 
communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual 
adviser.”  Id. 
141 Federal jurisdictions, using federal common law, recognize the privilege either 
explicitly or implicitly.  Pudelski, supra note 103, at 710.  All fifty states, however, have 
secured some form of the privilege by means of statutory law.  Beerworth, supra note 127, 
at 105; Jackson, supra note 126, at 1062; Keel, supra note 134, at 683.  “These privilege 
statutes are driven primarily by a respect for free exercise and church autonomy 
principles.”  Beerworth, supra note 127, at 105.  Today, the clergy-communicant privilege’s 
most powerful and important justification is that society views the clergyman-parishioner 
relationship as significant and worth fostering.  Horner, supra note 134, at 730. 
142 See Jackson, supra note 126, at 1058-59.  The Seal of Confession is a deeply rooted 
Catholic tradition that can be traced back over fifteen hundred years to the times of the 
New Testament.  Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708. 
143 See Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708-09.  Some churches view a “[v]iolation of the 
seal . . . [as] a ‘crime’ against the Church and a sin against God . . . .”  Beerworth, supra note 
127, at 106.  As such, denominations such as that of Catholics, treat the confessional 
relationship as sacrosanct.  Id. at 105. 
144 Code of Canon Law 983 specifically provides that “the sacramental seal is inviolable; 
therefore, it is absolutely forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a penitent in words 
or in any matter for any reason.”  The Code of Canon Law c.983, § 1 (1983), 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_ _P3G.HTM (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).  The 
Code goes on to state that anyone who breaks the seal can be excommunicated.  See 
Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708-09 (noting that excommunication is a common punishment 
for breaching this sacred tenet); Jackson, supra note 126, at 1059 (discussing the penalty of 
exile for violating the seal of secrecy); Beerworth, supra note 127, at 106 (stating, “the 
penalty prescribed in most cases is automatic excommunication – a permanent alienation 
from the Church and from God Himself”).  The significance of the secrecy held in 
confession is emphasized in the 1983 revised Code of Canon Law by using the phrase “it is 
a crime for a confessor to betray a penitent” as opposed to the 1917 Code, which stated less 
stringently that the confessor was “carefully to guard against” betraying the penitent.  
O’Brien, supra note 127, at 31. 
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confessional matters, as offered to a Catholic clergyman, are held 
sacrosanct.145 
These deeply rooted Catholic origins of the clergy-communicant 
privilege suggest that the privilege applies most directly to those of the 
Catholic faith.146  However, there is no clergy-communicant privilege 
statute that applies exclusively to Catholic priests.147  Rather, the 
language is typically open-ended so as to include the religious functions 
and practices of all established denominations.148  This said, some 
statutes may provide more protection for some religions than others due 
to wording variations in different state statutes.149 
There are three main approaches that states take in formulating their 
clergy-communicant privilege statutes, ranging from very conservative 
to very liberal.150  Generally, clergy-communicant statutes were enacted 
                                                 
145 Id.  “[T]he Code of Canon Law establishes that the Seal is all encompassing and 
contains no exceptions.  All matters that fall within the Seal of Confession are 
sacrosanct . . . .” Id. 
146 Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708 (suggesting that, “because in most other religions it 
does not violate religious law to disclose confidential information,” the privilege most 
directly applies to the Catholic Church). 
147 GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:6.  The clergy-communicant 
privilege, as it exists today, has been extended to protect conversations between clergymen 
of non-Catholic religious denominations and their followers.  Horner, supra note 134, at 
729.  “Therefore, while the earlier policy of protecting the Catholic priest’s canonical duties 
was applicable only to Catholicism, the privilege as the courts apply it today is equally 
applicable to both non-Western and Western religions, as well as established and nascent 
Western religions.”  Id. 
148 GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:6.  Other religious 
institutions that recognize formal sacraments of confession apart from Catholicism are: 
Latter-Day Saints, Eastern Orthodox churches, Episcopal churches, American Lutherans, 
Presbyterians, United Presbyterians, the American Baptist Convention, and various Jewish 
groups.  Beerworth, supra note 127, at 105; GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 
138, at § 6:1 nn.11-12. 
149 Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708.  Jurisdictions mainly vary in their definition of who 
constitutes the clergy, what the scope of protection afforded to the communication should 
be, and to whom the privilege belongs.  Jackson, supra note 126, at 1063.  There are three 
types of clergy privileges: (1) those that specify the religious denominations they protect; 
(2) those that fail to specify particular denominations, but still show a preference toward 
particular religions through special words like “priest[;]” and (3) those that are neutral 
toward all religions.  See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 126, at 1063; Pudelski, supra note 103, at 
711. 
150 The three main approaches that states use in implementing clergy-communicant 
statutes are the conservative approach, the modern approach, and the broad approach.  
Jackson, supra note 126, at 1064.  The conservative approach is the narrowest method of 
applying the privilege and essentially allows only for the confidentiality of those 
communications made under the sacrament of confession.  Id.  The modern approach is 
more liberal in that it protects any communication made to a member of the clergy in the 
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in response to the need to be able to confide in those entrusted with the 
task of providing spiritual solace and advice without fear of reprisal.151  
Thus, if a communication is not intended to be confidential, then it is not 
in the purview of the privilege.152  However, due to the varying 
approaches states have taken, the extent of the scope of what is allowed 
to be confidential and with whom differs.153  For instance, many statutes 
include communications made for both confessional purposes and those 
for spiritual counseling to anyone acting in the official capacity of a 
spiritual advisor.154  Furthermore, while the majority of states say that 
                                                                                                             
course of “seeking spiritual counsel or advice.”  Id.  This approach relieves the court from 
having to determine “whether a person was making the communication for the purpose of 
receiving forgiveness for their sins” as well as “which religious denominations require 
auricular confession.”  Id.  (quoting Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is it (Past) Time 
for a Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1627, 1646-47 (2003)).  Lastly, the broad approach protects all communications made to a 
clergy member functioning in his or her professional capacity, without any regard to 
spiritual purpose.  Jackson, supra note 126, at 1064.  The variety of communications 
protected under the broad approach include: “child rearing advice, employment 
counseling, and personal problems such as alcoholism or sexual dysfunction.”  Id. 
151 GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:1.  The pervading result of 
such confidentiality is that “harmony with one’s self and others can be realized.”  Id. 
To carry out their mission of providing spiritual and moral guidance 
and succor during times of personal crisis, military chaplains must 
develop and keep the trust of those they serve . . . . 
. . . If those who are battling loneliness and resentment feel that their 
chaplains will have to testify against them about some or all of what 
they have revealed in confidence, they are likely to avoid going to 
them for solace. 
United States v. Isham, 48 M.J. 603, 607 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). 
152 Jackson, supra note 126, at 1062.  “Every state requires that the communication in 
question must have been made in private, to a clergyman in their professional capacity as a 
member of the clergy, and with the expectation of privacy.”  Id. at 1064. 
153 Some states have expanded the privilege beyond the confessional, to include both 
penitents and those persons seeking general spiritual counseling.  Pudelski, supra note 103, 
at 711; Keel, supra note 134, at 685. 
154 See Beerworth, supra note 127, at 105; Pudelski, supra note 103, at 711.  In some clergy-
communicant statutes, the position of spiritual advisor may be fulfilled not just by those 
members of the clergy officially recognized by the church, but also by those individuals 
who assist clergy in rendering advice.  GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138, 
at § 6:6.  Nevertheless, some courts have held it necessary that a cleric’s assistant be 
regularly engaged in minister-like activities to be covered under the privilege.  Id.  A few 
other statutes contain language specifically applying the privilege to lay individuals 
reasonably believed to be a minister by the penitent communicating to him.  Id.; see, e.g., 
FED. R. EVID. 506(a)(1) (not enacted), supra note 140.  In addition, “depending on the 
doctrines of the church involved and on the breadth of the relevant statute, the privilege 
may be extended to elders or other lay officials of a church.”  GREENWALD, MALONE & 
STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:6. 
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the privilege belongs to the penitent, there is still some confusion as to 
who has the right to invoke the privilege.155 
The main function of the clergy-communicant privilege, while well-
grounded in religious and judicial tradition, creates obstacles to the 
prosecution of child abuse perpetrators by permitting clerics to withhold 
from law enforcement officials valuable information transmitted to them 
in confidence.156  Before such obstacles can be removed, analysis of 
government intervention with, or abrogation of, the clergy-communicant 
privilege in relation to the Religion Clauses must ensue.157 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Sexual abuse of a minor is an evil that the State is permitted, if not 
compelled, to regulate for the maintenance of its health, safety, and 
welfare.158  Unfortunately, the problem of child sexual abuse has 
escalated to epidemic proportions.159  Despite law enforcement efforts to 
combat the abuse, states must do more by means of investigating, 
prosecuting, and punishing sexual abuse within the religious 
                                                 
155 Jackson, supra note 126, at 1064-65.  Confusion results from some states reasoning that 
clergymen have their own Free Exercise right to claim the privilege for themselves too.  Id. 
at 1065; Keel, supra note 134, at 684.  Regardless, the “decision to assert the privilege is 
“purely a voluntary decision, and the clergy member or communicant is free to depart 
from the religious tenets and to testify.”  Pudelski, supra note 103, at 708. 
156 See id. at 707-08 (discussing the essential function of the clergy-communicant 
privilege).  See also James T. O’Reilly & JoAnn M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: 
Confronting the Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
31, 59 (1994-95) (illustrating one obstacle created by the conflict between mandatory 
reporting statutes and the clergy-communicant privilege).  For example, a bishop who is 
furnished with information pertaining to instances of child sexual abuse and fails to 
“comply with state mandatory reporting statutes may also be sued for negligence per se, 
whether or not he is criminally charged for the violation.  A court could run into 
evidentiary conflicts if the priest-penitent privilege were invoked by the bishop regarding 
the admissions made by the priest.”  Id. 
157 See Beerworth, supra note 127, at 99 (“The jurisdictions that have decided to impose a 
general reporting duty on clergy have had to further decide whether to extend the duty to 
confidential communications with parishioners, or to retain the clergy-communicant 
privilege and thereby avoid a direct conflict between God and Caesar.”); see also infra Part 
III.A (analyzing the viability of government intervention into religious practices under First 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
158 See Jackson, supra note 126, at 1073 (stating, “The protection of children is a very 
legitimate and important state interest that must be carefully weighed against society’s 
interest in protecting and preserving the relationship between a clergy member and a 
parishioner.”); see also supra note 98 (discussing the Sherbert court’s limitations on 
government restrictions to those that are undertaken for the purpose of protecting public 
safety, peace, and order). 
159 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (detailing the statistical nature of child 
sexual abuse). 
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community, in order to achieve both greater protection of children and 
more even-handed justice.160  Part III.A analyzes the Religion Clause 
jurisprudence and how increased government intervention into religious 
institutions’ internal handling procedures would not violate the current 
law.161  Next, Part III.B recommends abrogating the clergy-communicant 
privilege in the narrowed context of mandatory child abuse reporting 
statutes and addresses some of the main arguments in opposition to such 
government action.162 
A. Religion Clause Applicability to Government Acts Combating Child Abuse 
in the Church 
The Religion Clause jurisprudence, while unpredictable and 
contradictory at times, has been resolute on the notion that the First 
Amendment “embraces two concepts, – freedom to believe and freedom 
to act,” with the first being absolute and the second being governable.163  
Thus, neither Congress nor the states may legislate an individual’s 
beliefs, but they are free to prohibit certain religious practices viewed as 
detrimental to the best interests of society overall.164  In conformance 
                                                 
160  “State legislatures should act to remove the enforcement hurdles faced by 
prosecutors, so that in the future, all of those responsible for the sexual abuse of children 
can be held criminally liable.”  Russell, supra note 38, at 914. 
161 See infra Part III.A (applying current Religion Clause jurisprudence to the question of 
feasibility regarding government interventions within religions communities). 
162 See infra Part III.B (addressing and refuting the main arguments proponents have for 
partially abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege); see also supra note 134 (listing the 
contentions opponents have against abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege). 
163 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 
709, 719 (2005); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).  Treatment of the tension 
inherent between the two clauses and application of the overall goal of the First 
Amendment is described as follows: 
[T]he Establishment Clause[] commands a separation of church and 
state . . . . [T]he Free Exercise Clause[] requires government respect for, 
and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of our 
Nation’s people . . . . 
Our decisions recognize that “there is room for play in the joints” 
between the Clauses, some space for legislative action neither 
compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the 
Establishment Clause. 
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719 (internal citations omitted). 
164 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (stating, “Congress was deprived of all legislative power 
over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties 
or subversive good order.”).  But see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (invalidating city ordinances prohibiting the ritual slaughter of 
animals that contained numerous exemptions for butchers, farmers, and other professions, 
making it clear that the law was passed out of stark animosity for the Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye).  The Court stated: 
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with this spirit, it is reasonable to presume that violations of federal and 
state child sexual abuse laws by religious institutions are not only 
punishable by law enforcement and judiciary officials, but the failure to 
do so is a First Amendment violation in itself.165 
The Court in Smith accurately noted that an individual’s religious 
beliefs have never “excuse[d] him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”166  Given 
that every state in the union, in addition to the federal government, 
enacted laws criminalizing sexual abuse of a minor, it logically follows 
that the State, having exercised its freedom to regulate, is now free to 
break through the veil of religion in enforcing its criminal ordinances 
equally among the religious and non-religious communities.167  
“[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond 
limitation” by the government; therefore, no religious institution can 
                                                                                                             
The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious 
tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state 
intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, 
all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the 
Constitution and to the rights it secures.  Those in office must be 
resolute in resisting importunate demands and must ensure that the 
sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are 
secular.  Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, 
designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. 
Id. at 547. 
165 See KURLAND, supra note 25; supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing reverse 
discrimination under the Religion Clauses); see also Henriques, supra note 21, at 22 
(“Precious as protecting religious freedom is, however, there are cases where these special 
breaks collide with other values important in this country – like extending the protections 
of government to all citizens and sharing the responsibilities of society fairly.”). 
166 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 
(1990).  In denying the respondents’ unemployment compensation due to their dismissal 
for use of peyote during a religious ceremony, the Court affirmed that it could not “afford 
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every 
regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.”  Id. at 888.  In 
further explaining its reasoning, the Court enumerated a variety of generally applicable 
laws that advance the overall goals of society and should not be saddled with religious 
exemptions but under the most stringent circumstances.  Id. at 888-89.  These laws include 
those governing: compulsory military service, payment of taxes, health and safety 
regulations such as punishment for manslaughter, child neglect laws, compulsory 
vaccination laws, drug laws, traffic laws, social welfare legislation such as minimum wage 
laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and anti-
discrimination laws.  Id.  See generally supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Smith decision). 
167 Every state has statutes prohibiting sexual contact with a minor child, as evidenced by 
the passage of mandatory reporting statutes.  See supra note 129 (listing the mandatory 
reporting statutes for most states). 
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successfully challenge the application of the general criminal laws 
against them.168 
Although possessing the right, if not the duty, to hold religious 
affiliates to the same legal standards as non-affiliates, both law 
enforcement officials and judges have been hesitant in doling out even-
handed justice to the victims of child sexual abuse.169  Preference still 
appears to be on allowing the religious institutions to govern for 
themselves, by their own bylaws and creeds, as the best means of 
remedying an otherwise egregious sin against society.170  The result of 
acting like a bystander has not only increased crime due to recidivist 
behavior, but also places greater strains on society’s ability to function 
effectively, such as an increased strain on family harmony, trauma to the 
minor victim impairing later contributions as an adult, and strain on 
social welfare programs.171 
The tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause, as applied to the question of whether the criminal justice system 
should intervene or blatantly override a particular religious institution’s 
                                                 
168 Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
169 See Fain, supra note 9, at 225. 
[T]he judiciary is often reluctant to impose liability on the church 
regardless of how bizarre the events engendering the claims.  
Continued and persistent media focus addressing the issue and 
exposing the clergy perpetrators of sexual abuse should exert pressure 
on the courts, as well as the churches, to do whatever is necessary to 
alter ministerial behavior. 
Id. 
170 See supra Part II.A (discussing internal church handling procedures and illustrations of 
the government’s hesitation to interfere with those procedures in recent incidents of child 
sexual abuse).  See also O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 127, at 5 (suggesting that abuse of 
children sexually is “one of the most egregious situations within society” today). 
171 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (“It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole 
community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for 
growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens.”).  Preventing child 
sexual abuse is an important societal interest due to the inherent damage it always has on 
the victim.  National Center, supra note 3.  Some of the potential consequences of child 
sexual abuse include: lowered self-esteem, suicidal impulses, shock, feelings of shame and 
guilt, aggression, eating disorders, increased vulnerability to future attacks, running away, 
social withdrawal, anxiety, fear, sleeping disorders, substance abuse, distrust of authority 
and authority figures, flashbacks, tendency to be involved in abusive relationships, 
offender behavior, feeling hopeless or helpless, difficulty in forming trusting, intimate 
relationships, lower likelihood of marriage, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.  
See, e.g., id.; WAYNE KRITSBERG, THE INVISIBLE WOUND: A NEW APPROACH TO HEALING 
CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE 56-57 (Bantam 1993); SUSAN MUFSON & RACHEL KRANZ, 
STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT CHILD ABUSE 74-75 (Facts on File 1991); DALE ROBERT REINERT, 
SEXUAL ABUSE AND INCEST 36-37 (Enslow Publishers 1997). 
Arnold: "Divine" Justice and the Lack of Secular Intervention: Abrogating
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
888 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
preferences when confronting child sexual abuse allegations, is clearly 
visible.172  On the one hand, by not applying the generally applicable 
criminal law equally to religious and non-religious adherents, the 
government is essentially giving preference to religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.173  On the other hand, too much intervention into 
the administrative aspects and general practices of a religious body can 
result in a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.174  The question 
becomes: how does one reconcile the two clauses? 
Both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause allow for 
such intervention, due to the State’s interest in maintaining a higher 
social norm.175  For example, in applying the Lemon test to a challenged 
government action interfering with a church’s normal administrative 
policy, the Court would find that interfering to prevent and punish child 
sexual abuse serves a secular purpose, its primary effect is not to 
advance or inhibit religion, and it does not “foster ‘an excessive 
government entanglement with religion.’”176  Similarly, under Sherbert’s 
strict scrutiny test, the Court would view any State interference as 
advancing a compelling government interest in the most narrowly 
tailored manner to effectively achieve the interest of punishing sexual 
abuse and preventing recidivism.177 
While neither the Lemon test nor the Sherbert test are consistently 
applied to Religion Clause cases, the jurisprudence pertaining to such is 
unambiguous as to the existence of room in the joints between the two 
                                                 
172 See supra text accompanying note 87 (discussing the inherent tensions between the 
Religion Clauses due to their entwinement).  “[E]fforts to protect the free exercise of 
religion can clash with efforts to assure that religion is not favored by the government.”  
Henriques, supra note 21, at 22. 
173 See supra text accompanying note 84 (suggesting that excluding religious adherents 
from generally applicable laws is the equivalent of penalizing non-adherents for their lack 
of faith). 
174 See supra note 87 (illustrating the inherent tension that exists between the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause). 
175 See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (“The right to practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill 
health or death.”); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (implying that 
protection under the Religion Clauses applies only to claims rooted in religious belief, not 
in religious practice); supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing religious 
convictions as inalienable and religious practices as governable). 
176 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting, in part, Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)); see also supra note 110 (presenting the three prongs of the 
Lemon test). 
177 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963); see also supra note 96 (explaining the 
requirements to meet the strict scrutiny standard). 
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Clauses in which the government can act.178  Permitting “individuals to 
be excused from compliance with the law solely on the basis of religious 
beliefs is to subject others to punishment for failure to subscribe to those 
same beliefs.”  This is an Establishment Clause violation, and reasonable 
intervention by the criminal justice system into the internal handling 
procedures of a particular religious institution would be permissible.179  
Thus, the question shifts to ask: what types of intervention are needed? 
B. The Pros and Cons of Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege 
Both the state and federal governments have a tradition of 
integrating themselves into the daily lives of their citizens and justify 
doing so as being in the best interest and overall benefit of said 
individuals.180  Within the criminal realm, the government has taken 
proactive measures to not only punish and deter crime, but also to 
uncover less visible crimes such as drug trafficking, sale of illegal guns, 
and child pornography, in order to prevent future crimes.181  Even sexual 
abuse has proven to be within reach of the government’s arm.182  By 
extrapolation, then, because it is common knowledge that sexual abuse 
does not stop at the churchyard gate, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
                                                 
178 See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719, supra note 163 (discussing the “play in the joints” standard 
for determining constitutional validity of government acts); see also supra notes 108, 122 
(noting the inconsistent court decisions that arise due to the irregular applications between 
the Lemon and Sherbert tests). 
179 KURLAND, supra note 1, at 22. 
180 Examples of government integration for the overall benefit of its citizens include: 
social welfare, Social Security, and Medicare. 
181 See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (stating that it is constitutionally 
permissible for ownership of child pornography to be criminally punished and that there is 
no freedom of speech conflict when it comes to protecting children from sexual 
exploitation). 
182 Every state has statutes prohibiting sexual contact with a minor child.  See, e.g., ALA. 
CODE § 13A-6-69.1 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405 
(West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-405 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 778 
(West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33.1 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1506 (West 
2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.249 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (West 
2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-602 (West 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-13 (West 
2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-27.7A (West 2006); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6318 (West 2006); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-522 (West 2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25 (Vernon 2006); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-401.1 (West 2006).  For examples of federal statutes pertaining to 
sexual abuse of a minor, see: 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2244 (2006); see also supra note 129 (stating that all fifty states have implemented 
mandatory reporting statutes to help prosecute child sexual abuse). 
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that the government stretch out its arm further by implementing greater 
measures to combat such abuses within the church.183 
One such measure that should be taken in an effort to combat child 
abuse within the church is to universally abrogate the clergy-
communicant privilege in pre-existing mandatory reporting statutes.184  
While several states have already abrogated the clergy-communicant 
privilege in one fashion or another, the vast majority of states have yet to 
do so for several possible reasons.185 
First, opponents to the abrogation of the privilege, even in the 
limited context proposed in this Note, may contend that to do so would 
constitute a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.186  However, as 
previously discussed, Smith allows for the general application of 
religiously neutral laws toward religious institutions.187  Abrogation of 
the privilege would not mean that individuals cannot believe in child 
sexual abuse, pedophilia, or any other heinous crime, just as the Native 
American Church was never told it could not believe in peyote as a 
religious item or the Mormons in polygamy as a means of achieving 
favor with God.188  Religious beliefs, provided they are sincerely held, 
are protected regardless of how extreme or bizarre.189  But alas, believing 
                                                 
183 See supra Part II.A (illustrating the child sexual abuse problem within the church and 
how several religious institutions confront it). 
184 See supra Part II.C (addressing mandatory reporting statutes); see also supra Part II.D 
(discussing the clergy-communicant privilege). 
185 See O’Brien & Flannery, supra note 135, at 29 (discussing the number of states that 
include clergy into their reporting statutes and the varying manners by which clergy are 
incorporated); see also supra note 134 (presenting abrogation opponents’ rationales). 
186 See Keel, supra note 134, at 682-83 (suggesting one reason not to abrogate the clergy-
communicant privilege is the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment). 
187 See supra note 102 (discussing the Smith test application on personal religious 
practices).  A violation would occur under former free exercise precedents because a “child 
abuse reporting statute that abrogates all privileges, including the priest-penitent 
privilege . . . pressures the clergyman to either adhere to his religious beliefs and accept 
criminal sanctions or abandon his beliefs to avoid such sanctions.”  See Keel, supra note 134, 
at 713.  However, under the current Smith rationale, “any free exercise argument would fail 
because a child abuse reporting statute that requires all persons to report occurrences of 
child abuse and that grants exemptions to no person or class of persons would be viewed 
as a neutral law, generally applicable to all.”  Id. 
188 See supra text accompanying note 100 (examining the Smith holding regarding 
whether religious use of peyote could legally be prosecuted); see also supra note 91 and 
accompanying text (addressing the Reynolds court’s approach to whether religiously 
sanctioned polygamous practices were constitutionally protected). 
189 See generally United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that the 
government is prohibited from determining whether individual convictions are true or 
false and from interfering in people’s right to believe in what they want; however, it is 
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in something and practicing it are not always harmonious with the social 
policies and rights of others.190  In a society that cherishes freedom and 
equality, it is reasonable to assert that everyone is free to believe in the 
tenets they choose; however, it is unreasonable and unjust to suggest 
that Person A, who is agnostic, should be held to a higher standard of 
the criminal law than Person B, who is a well-respected minister.191  The 
inequities of permitting freedom of religious practice to reign supreme 
are inherently conflicting with the ideals laid out by the Framers.192 
Additionally, by not abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege, 
the government is committing an Establishment Clause violation by 
preferring religion over other testimonial privileges such as the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.193  In cases like these, the flexibility 
between the Religion Clauses is critical.194  Moreover, given that the 
social policy behind uncovering, investigating, and prosecuting child 
sexual abuse offenders is unquestionably compelling, the scale weighs in 
favor of avoiding an Establishment Clause violation by abrogating the 
                                                                                                             
permitted to interfere with or place burdens on certain acts performed in conformance with 
those convictions). 
190 See supra text accompanying note 93 (addressing the danger in permitting individual 
religious practices to proceed unrestricted). 
191 See Ayers, supra note 94 (suggesting that the concerns and wellbeing of society as a 
whole should come first, before the religious interests of individuals). 
192 The Constitution opens with a preamble expressly encapsulating the intent of the 
Framers: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
U.S. CONST. pmbl.  Later constitutional amendments were made to unquestionably breathe 
more life into the concept of “securing the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves,” as seen in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
193 The difficulty that arises when abrogating certain privileges is that: 
courts do not enforce the prohibitions equally among the various 
classes of professionals that are otherwise entitled to assert such a 
privilege.  Specifically, several states abrogate the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, but states retain the priest-penitent privilege in child 
abuse cases . . . . 
. . . [As a result,] states that have abrogated the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege in child abuse reporting statutes and have not similarly 
abrogated the priest-penitent privilege may very well have, by virtue 
of that fact alone, run afoul of the Establishment Clause. 
Keel, supra note 134, at 687-88, 692-93. 
194 See supra note 163 (discussing the flexibility built into the Religion Clauses). 
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privilege, even at the risk of potentially violating the Free Exercise 
Clause by those members of the clergy torn between their religious 
tenets and the law.195 
Admittedly, at the time the First Amendment was ratified, religious 
diversity was minimal and the idea was to create a nearly unbreakable 
law to protect the free exercise of religion, but as a practical matter 
today, such freedoms of religious practice must be restricted by those 
laws that the government has a compelling, religiously neutral, interest 
in passing.196  To allow otherwise would open a Pandora’s Box by 
allowing individuals to create their own new religions solely to 
circumvent criminal laws.197  Not only would this further the rampant 
problem of child sexual abuse, but it would create a slippery slope 
toward chaos in society as a whole.198  Rather than open the flood gates 
to potential social disorder, it is a wiser course of action to start 
implementing new laws and judicial measures that may encroach upon 
certain religious practices.199 
                                                 
195 See Keel, supra note 134, at 713 (“[S]uch privileges are not guaranteed by the 
Constitution, and states have broad discretion to weigh other interests against the need to 
provide for confidentiality.”). 
196 See supra note 81 (discussing the minimal religious diversity at the time of the 
Founding Fathers); see also supra note 93 (explaining the danger of allowing individuals to 
become laws unto themselves). 
197 According to the Greek myth, Pandora was molded by the gods under order from 
Jupiter, in an attempt to punish mankind for receiving the gift of fire from Prometheus.  
LUCIA IMPELLUSO, GODS AND HEROES IN ART 196 (2003).  Pandora was given special 
qualities from each of the gods, making her irresistible.  Id.  Jupiter then sent Pandora as a 
gift to Prometheus’ brother Epimetheus, who, failing to heed his brother’s warning not to 
accept gifts from the gods, accepted her as his wife.  Id.  Inside the house of Epimetheus, 
Pandora found an ornate chest, which she was instructed by her husband not to open.  Id.  
Succumbing to curiosity, however, Pandora peeked inside the chest.  Id.  The chest 
contained all of the plagues of humanity, which were released upon the Earth once 
Pandora opened the chest.  Id.  Pandora then, by Jupiter’s instruction, proceeded to close 
the chest, leaving only hope inside.  Id.  Additionally, society commonly refers to self-
created or unorthodox “new-age” religions as cults.  WEBSTER’S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 198 (Gramercy Books 1997) (defining “cult” as “a religion or sect considered to 
be false, unorthodox, or extremist”). 
198 Essentially, not applying neutral, generally applicable laws equally would allow 
individuals to become supreme laws unto themselves under the guise of being sanctioned 
by their religious beliefs, as feared by the Reynolds court.  See generally Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Employment Div. Dep’t. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990). 
199 See supra note 137 (discussing how mandatory reporting statutes advance the state’s 
interest in prosecuting child sexual abusers and suggesting that clergy members are the 
state’s most important resource in achieving that goal). 
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Naturally, sweeping changes must come in baby steps.  While there 
is much to be done by means of furthering criminal prosecutions of sex 
offenders in the church, the first course of action should be to abrogate 
the clergy-communicant privilege so that all clergy may be included 
under the mandatory reporting statutes.200  Abolishing the privilege will 
protect against clergy members confessing to each other to avoid 
prosecution.201  With the privilege abolished for purposes of the 
reporting statutes, clergy members will be posed with a choice: whether 
it is better to allow a morally corrupt sex offender to go free or 
uninvestigated, providing ample opportunities for recidivism, or risk 
punishment themselves for failing to report on a congregant or fellow 
clergyman.202 
A second argument that might be posed by anti-abrogationists is 
that the threat of clergy disclosing communications will seriously deter 
individuals from either seeking confession or spiritual guidance.203  The 
argument continues that the abrogation will actually result in an increase 
in child sexual abuse, because those perpetrators who might have sought 
spiritual healing will be deterred from doing so, thus never obtaining the 
help they require to cease their vicious crimes.204  Furthermore, 
                                                 
200 See supra note 135 (discussing the states that have already abrogated the clergy-
communicant privilege within their mandatory reporting statutes). 
201 See supra Part II.D (addressing the history, purpose, and scope of the clergy-
communicant privilege). 
202 See supra note 133 (noting that the new criminal sanctions give more force to their 
mandatory reporting statutes); see also supra note 125 (discussing the difficulty of 
discovering and prosecuting child sexual abuse). 
203 Jackson, supra note 126, at 1062; Keel, supra note 134, at 683.  See generally O’Brien & 
Flannery, supra note 127, at 26-29.  Members of the clergy hold positions of great power and 
trust, thus parishioners commonly turn to them for emotional and spiritual guidance.  Fain, 
supra note 9, at 211. 
Statistics have shown that in times of emotional strain or anxiety, more 
people resort to their clergyperson than to other professionals, such as 
physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers.  
According to a report prepared by the Joint Commission on Mental 
Illness and Health, “in times of emotional or domestic trouble, 
approximately forty-two percent of individuals consult clergymen, 
twenty-nine percent seek help from physicians, eighteen percent 
consult psychiatrists or psychologists, and ten percent turned to clinics 
or other social agencies.” 
Id. at 212 (quoting, in part, Kimberly Anne Klee, Note, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the 
Good Samaritan or a Blessing in Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 219 (1985)). 
204 Jackson, supra note 126, at 1069; Beerworth, supra note 127, at 112 (discussing the 
possibility that more instances of child abuse will go undetected due to the deterrence from 
confessing and seeking spiritual guidance).  Society benefits from the pastoral counseling; 
consequently, blockading the clergy results in diminished social harmony.  Id.; Keel, supra 
note 134, at 683.  But see Jackson, supra note 126, at 1071 (“Western judicial systems can 
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opponents may express concern that abolishing the privilege for 
reporting purposes will hinder an individual’s ability to cleanse his (or 
her) soul.205 
These arguments are flawed, however, given that several states have 
already begun to recognize the need for requiring religious officials to 
report their knowledge regarding instances of child abuse without 
experiencing a total breakdown of order or religion.206  Consequently, 
there is little reason for all states and the federal government not to 
follow suit.207  Although it may be true that some individuals might be 
deterred from revealing information to clergy members, they are by no 
means prevented from doing so.208  For example, some laypersons may 
be deterred from confessing, but if knowledge of their abuse is 
discovered through means outside confession, then reporting statutes 
would mandate the disclosure of such information.209  Therefore, at least 
for those individuals truly of faith, it would remain more beneficial to 
confess and obtain spiritual absolution of sin and guilt than not to 
confess but still potentially be reported.210  Those who sincerely believe 
in the purpose and power of seeking spiritual guidance will not greatly 
be deterred or hindered from doing so by knowing that clergy are not 
                                                                                                             
operate without the priest-penitent privilege.  No empirical evidence exists to demonstrate 
that parishioners or penitents would forgo spiritual counseling or confession if their 
communications with the clergy member were not protected by a privilege.”). 
205 See Jackson, supra note 126, at 1069.  “Christian eschatology holds that failure to obtain 
absolution or do penance for one’s sins before death is met with the prospect of eternal 
damnation.”  Beerworth, supra note 127, at 107.  In the Catholic tradition, for example, 
confession is only one of seven sacramental pillars; congregants are also expected to make a 
full confession at least once annually.  Id. at 105-06; 107. 
206 See supra note 136 (listing the states that have already abrogated the clergy-
communicant privilege in some form or another). 
207 See supra note 136. 
208 See supra note 151 (suggesting the importance of maintaining confidentiality is to 
protect and encourage clergy-parishioner relationships). 
209 Any ambiguity that currently exists as to whether something is or is not considered a 
confidential communication under a state’s clergy-communicant privilege statute, for 
purposes of abiding by the mandatory reporting statutes, would be eliminated by simply 
abrogating the privilege altogether. 
210 See supra text accompanying note 144 (addressing the sanctity of confidentiality in 
confession under the Code of Canon Law); see also supra note 127 (stating that the main 
purpose of mandatory reporting statutes is to protect children from the atrocity that is child 
sexual abuse). 
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only free to, but required to, report learned or suspected knowledge of 
child sexual abuse.211 
A third concern about abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege 
is the privacy interest congregants have in maintaining a confidential 
clergy-communicant relationship.212  Opponents might argue that the 
privilege was established initially to protect the individual’s privacy 
rights; thereby, the abolition of the privilege will lead to the downfall of 
individual privacy in the context of religion.213  Indeed, privacy rights 
are a crucial element to individual autonomy and should be protected.214  
However, this Note does not call for the complete abrogation of the 
clergy-communicant privilege in all contexts, but rather just so far as is 
necessary to make mandatory reporting statutes more effective in 
uncovering child sexual abuse.215  While it is arguably a violation of 
privacy for certain communications made in confidence to later be 
disclosed, the amount of actual interference in personal privacy by 
requiring clergy members to abide by reporting laws is minimal.216  If 
governments abrogate the privilege only so far as to require disclosure of 
sexual abuse information, then nearly all communications between the 
                                                 
211 See supra text accompanying note 14; see also supra note 133 (discussing the possible 
criminal and civil sanctions for those who fail to abide by the mandatory reporting 
statutes). 
212 Keel, supra note 134, at 683; see also Jackson, supra note 126, at 1070 (quoting, in part, 
Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell?  Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the 
Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 769 (1987)) (“The privacy 
rationale is based upon ‘each person’s interest in the dignity of privacy for his most 
intimate relationships.’”). 
213 The statutes encompassing the privilege were enacted in their varying forms in 
response to the need for people to be able to confide in those entrusted with the task of 
providing spiritual solace and advice without fear of reprisal so that “harmony with one’s 
self and others can be realized.”  GREENWALD, MALONE & STAUFFER, supra note 138, at § 6:1 
(quoting Keenan v. Giagnte, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (N.Y. 1979)).  However, testimonial 
“privileges contravene the principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s 
evidence.’”  Jackson, supra note 126, at 1061 (quoting, in part, Trammel v. United States, 445 
U.S. 40, 50 (1980)); see also Horner, supra note 134, at 731. 
214 See supra note 98 (stating that individuals may not be punished merely for holding 
beliefs contrary with or abhorrent to government officials). 
215 See supra note 126 (suggesting that mandatory reporting statutes increase the 
likelihood that information will lead to prosecution of child sexual abusers); see also infra 
Part IV (presenting a model mandatory reporting statute that abrogates the clergy-
communicant privilege for reporting purposes only). 
216 Only those communications that specifically pertain to child abuse or cause the 
suspicion of child abuse would need to be disclosed; thus, only those individuals who 
perpetrate such egregious crimes relinquish the right to complete privacy. 
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clergy and the communicant would still remain protected, as would their 
individual rights to privacy.217 
As a last attempt at maintaining the clergy-communicant privilege in 
its entirety, anti-abrogationists might resort to using a slippery slope 
argument.218  If governments can be trusted, however, then the slippery 
slope argument is reduced to logical paranoia.219  It may in fact be true 
that once the State is comfortable enough with abrogating the privilege 
in one context, there is a risk that it might soon extend further into other 
contexts until the privilege is non-existent.220  Nevertheless, this 
argument is defective to the extent that exceptions have been carved out 
of other evidentiary privileges with little (if any) backlash.221  Also, while 
it might be beneficial for law enforcement officials to be able to compel 
clergy to report knowledge of theft, homicide, or other criminal acts, 
religious communities are not undergoing a current epidemic of such 
crimes.222  The heinousness of the child sexual abuse problem, if left to 
the current system, will perpetually grow until confidence in the church 
is fictional, thereby rendering the need for any form of the privilege 
superfluous because people who place no trust in their religious leaders 
will not seek confession or guidance from them.223 
                                                 
217 Id. 
218 Jackson, supra note 126, at 1070; see also supra note 134 (suggesting that anti-
abrogationists might make a slippery slope argument in opposition to abrogating the 
clergy-communicant privilege). 
219 See also supra note 134 (presenting some of the potential arguments opponents to 
abrogation may make). 
220 Id. 
221 While not officially enacted by Congress, federal common law privileges, recognized 
by the Supreme Court, carve out exceptions for reporting, such as in the husband-wife 
privilege.  See FED. R. EVID. 505 (not enacted).  According to proposed Rule 505, there is no 
husband-wife privilege “(1) in proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a crime 
against the person or property of the other or of a child of either, or with a crime against 
the person or property of a third person committed in the course of committing a crime 
against the other, or (2) as to matters occurring prior to the marriage . . . .”  Id. at (c)(1)-(2).  
Similarly, proposed rule 504 carves out exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
for communications relevant to proceedings for hospitalizing a patient for mental illnesses, 
communications made in the course of a judge-ordered mental examination, or 
communications made during the course of a mental examination conducted as a condition 
to a claim of self-defense.  FED. R. EVID. 504 (not enacted). 
222 See supra note 3 (providing statistics documenting the current child sexual abuse 
pandemic). 
223 See supra Part II.A (presenting illustrations of certain institutions’ internal handling 
policies and how they foster recidivism); see also supra note 141 (suggesting the main 
justification for maintaining the clergy-communicant privilege is because people recognize 
the clergy-parishioner relationship as one worth fostering). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 [2008], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss3/4
2008] Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege 897 
It is preferable social policy to prevent people from using confession 
or spiritual guidance as a cloak to hide their acts from the justice 
system.224  As officials uncover more sexual abuse scandals, it is more 
certain that the clergy-communicant privilege cannot be trusted not to be 
used as a shield by recidivistic child sexual offenders.  While 
perpetrators seek solace in the spiritual guidance and forgiveness of the 
church by asking that their guilt or sins be healed for the eternal salvation 
of their souls, their innocent victims are left without justice or confidence 
in their own spiritual counselors.225  Consequently, the minds (and 
possibly souls) of those betrayed child victims are left with little comfort 
from either their religious institution or their law enforcement agencies, 
while their perpetrators are essentially protected and allowed to repeat a 
vicious cycle of abuse.226  Moreover, given how varied the state laws are 
in terms of application of the clergy-communicant privilege, it would be 
more judicially efficient as well as administratively productive, to 
abrogate the privilege entirely when it comes to child abuse reporting.227 
Naturally, certain mechanisms should be in place to protect clergy 
members and religion, such as limiting the abrogation to child abuse 
communications only, maintaining reporter anonymity, and providing 
exemptions from testifying.228  Provided the statutes contain provisions 
specifically limiting clergy reporting responsibilities, then the 
interference with the traditional practices of clergy confidentiality or 
                                                 
224 Employment Div. Dep’t. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) 
(addressing the need to enforce generally applicable laws equally).  Generally applicable 
laws are just that—generally applicable.  Individuals cannot be allowed to hide under the 
cloak of religion to avoid the appropriate punishments for a crime; otherwise, they would 
essentially be allowed to render their own laws and system of justice, thereby contravening 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.  Id. 
225  “Child abuse is a heinous crime that can scar the mental health of a child for the 
remainder of his life.”  William W. Blue, State v. Williquette: Protecting Children from Abuse 
through the Imposition of a Legal Duty, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 171, 171 (1988); see also supra 
note 171 (discussing the traumatizing consequences of child sexual abuse). 
226 See supra Part II.A (illustrating the problem of child abuse and the lack of justice many 
victims find).  In fact, it can be contended that clergy members owe an even greater duty to 
children to report abuse than a stranger or professional in a less intimate relationship.  
Blue, supra note 225, at 183. 
227 See supra note 150 (discussing the different approaches states take in formulating their 
clergy-communicant privilege statutes). 
228 See infra Part IV (demonstrating how certain protections may effectively be 
incorporated into a reporting statute while simultaneously abrogating the clergy-
communicant privilege). 
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silence is minimal and in accordance with the dictates of the First 
Amendment.229 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The clergy-communicant privilege is one deeply rooted in religious 
tradition and universally recognized throughout the United States.230  As 
a result, many states are reluctant to abrogate the privilege in even 
narrowly defined contexts, at the cost of weakening law enforcement’s 
ability to uncover, investigate, and prosecute sexual crimes against 
minors.231  With careful drafting of the mandatory reporting statutes, 
many of the fears that plague those favoring the absolute power of the 
clergy-communicant privilege can be surmounted.232  The model statute 
below, with commentary, demonstrates how certain measures can be 
incorporated into current reporting laws so that clergy members can aid 
law enforcement officials while simultaneously reserving some 
protections for their positions as religious leaders.233 
(1) For the purpose of this statute, persons mandated to 
report shall include but not be limited to a: physician, 
surgeon, resident physician or intern, osteopathic 
physician, nurse, medical examiner, dentist, dental 
hygienist, teacher, coach of intramural or interscholastic 
activities, school principal, school personnel, social 
worker, guidance counselor, coroner, child-caring 
personnel, chiropractor, optometrist, emergency medical 
technician, paramedic, health professional, mental 
health professional, psychologist, pharmacist, peace 
officer, probation officer, parole officer, member of the 
clergy, Christian Science practitioner, or priest, or any 
organization or agency for any of the above, who knows 
or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is 
dependent, neglected or abused, regardless of whether 
                                                 
229 See infra Part IV (demonstrating how certain protections may effectively be 
incorporated into a reporting statute while simultaneously abrogating the clergy-
communicant privilege). 
230 See supra Part II.D (exploring the history of the clergy-communicant privilege). 
231 See supra Part III.B (addressing the main concerns with abrogating the clergy-
communicant privilege). 
232 Id.; see supra note 134 (outlining some of the arguments that may be made by anti-
abrogationists). 
233 The model statute is a combination of provisions and language used by several states 
in their existing reporting statutes.  The proposed amendments are italicized and are the 
contribution of the author. 
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the person believed to have caused the dependency, 
neglect or abuse is a parent, guardian, person exercising 
custodial control or supervision or another person, who 
has attended such child as a part of his professional 
duties.234 
Commentary: 
Section one specifically incorporates clergy members with the other 
professionals included in the non-exhaustive list typically found in 
reporting statutes.  The language uses both priest and clergy member, 
denoting that the statute is inclusive of all religious officials, regardless 
of denomination.235 
(2) Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to 
believe that a child is dependent, neglected or abused, or 
may become subjected to dependency, neglect, or abuse shall 
immediately cause an oral or written report to be made 
to a local law enforcement agency or the ____ State 
Police; the cabinet or its designated representative; the 
Commonwealth’s attorney or the county attorney; by 
telephone or otherwise.  Any supervisor who receives 
from an employee a report of suspected dependency, 
neglect or abuse shall promptly make a report to the 
proper authorities for investigation.236  All such reports 
must remain confidential unless the person consents 
otherwise.  A member of the clergy, Christian Science 
practitioner or priest who has received a confidential 
communication or a confession in that person’s 
professional capacity in the course of the discipline 
enjoined by the church to which the member of the 
clergy, Christian Science practitioner or priest belongs 
may not withhold reporting of the communication or 
confession.  This includes not only communications or 
confessions but also personal observations the member of 
the clergy, Christian Science practitioner or priest may 
otherwise make of the minor.237  Nothing in this section is 
                                                 
234 The list of professionals is adapted from: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030(2) (West 2006); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101(b) (2006). 
235 See supra text accompanying note 135 (discussing the types of reporting statutes and 
the primary methods for including clergy within their scope). 
236 Excerpted from KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030(1) (West 2006). 
237 Adapted from ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(A) (West 2006). 
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meant to preclude any person from their obligations to report 
abuse or neglect. 
Commentary: 
The inclusion of the phrase “may become subjected to” in section 
two allows the statute to serve as both an investigative tool for 
prosecutors and law enforcement officials and as a preventative 
measure.  In this capacity, individuals who know of or suspect a person 
of committing a prior offense and know of or foresee incidents in the 
near future that they reasonably believe may lead to child abuse should 
report the person.  The statute also contains a provision designed to 
protect the confidentiality of the sensitive material disclosed as well as 
the anonymity of those disclosing it.  Preserving anonymity avoids 
tarnishing the clergy’s reputation, thereby preserving the trust necessary 
to continue counseling parishioners.  If parishioners continue to confide 
in their clergy, then more opportunities to discover instances of child 
sexual abuse arise. 
Section two also contains a specific provision officially abrogating 
the clergy-communicant privilege in the limited context of reporting 
abuse.  The emphasis that clergy are required to report, despite any 
privileges encapsulated in their roles as clerics, protects against any 
confusion clergy members, congregants, and law enforcement officials 
may have as to the extent of the statute’s reach.  The statute also 
underscores the principle that all knowledge of child abuse, not just that 
which is obtained in confessions, must be disclosed. 
(3) A person who complies with section (2) of this provision 
and furnishes a report, information or records to the 
appropriate enforcement agency shall be immune from any 
civil or criminal liability by reason of that action unless 
the person acted with malice or unless the person has 
been charged with or is suspected of abusing or 
neglecting the child or children in question.238 
Commentary: 
Section three rewards immunity for reporters, thus providing an 
essential incentive for clergy members to comply.  If torn between 
reporting on a communicant and risking retribution in the form of civil 
suits from said individual, a clergy member might otherwise choose 
                                                 
238 Adapted from ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(J) (West 2006). 
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silence, consequently defeating the purpose of the statute by allowing 
potential offenders to go unreported and uninvestigated.239  Providing 
immunity also prevents people from reaping financial benefits through 
civil suits merely because others complied with the reporting laws. 
(4) In any civil or criminal litigation in which a child’s 
neglect, dependency, physical injury, abuse, or 
abandonment is an issue, a member of the clergy, a 
Christian Science practitioner or a priest shall not be 
examined as a witness concerning any confession or 
communication made to him in his role as a member of 
the clergy, a Christian Science practitioner or a priest in 
the course of the discipline enjoined by the church to 
which he belongs.  Nothing in this subsection discharges 
a member of the clergy, a Christian Science practitioner 
or a priest from the duty to report pursuant to section (2) 
of this provision.240 
Commentary: 
The noteworthy provision in section four is the testifying exemption 
offered to clergy members.  The exemption is significant not only 
because clergy members will likely be more willing to report abuse if 
they do not fear courts compelling them to testify publicly, but because it 
maintains their anonymity as guaranteed above in section two. 
(5) A person who violates section (2) of this provision shall 
be guilty of at least a class 1 misdemeanor unless it is 
judicially determined that the offense necessitates elevating the 
crime to a class 6 felony.241  Additionally, a person who 
violates section (2) of this provision may be civilly liable for 
negligence per se to the child or children in question. 
Commentary: 
Section five instills life into the statute by providing criminal and 
civil penalties for failing to abide by the dictates of section two.  Use of 
the word may in regards to the imposition of civil liability protects those 
individuals who are charged under this section for failing to report 
                                                 
239 See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose for implementing 
mandatory reporting statutes). 
240 Adapted from ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(L) (West 2006). 
241 Adapted from ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(O) (West 2006). 
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suspected cases of future abuse.  In those instances, the trier of fact 
should first determine whether the accused had sufficient knowledge of 
suspected future abuse before deeming him civilly liable.  Although the 
possibility of civil liability in such situations might require more judicial 
resources to resolve, it would also encourage clergy to report reasonably 
predicted child abuse cases, thereby increasing the probability that a case 
is investigated.  The potential to save a child from the life-long trauma of 
sexual abuse outweighs preserving judicial resources.242 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Sexual abuse of a minor is a monstrous crime, repugnant to the 
social fibers of the United States, and yet, it is a crisis that has infiltrated 
both the home and the chapel.  States have already taken measures to 
combat such crimes against our youth.  Regrettably, however, these 
measures too often fail to breach the churchyard gate, thus allowing a 
considerable number of child abuse incidents to go uninvestigated and 
unpunished.  Government officials appear to be content in entrusting 
individual religious institutions with the task of seeking out and 
eliminating such sexual deviations within their borders.  This tactic, 
unfortunately, has been counter-productive in the fight against child 
sexual abuse. 
The religious protections ensured by the First Amendment have 
played a role in governments’ reluctance to intrude upon the autonomy 
of religious institutions.  This hesitation to intervene is unnecessary, 
however, because current Religion Clause jurisprudence allows for 
generally applicable, facially neutral criminal laws to be applied equally 
to the secular and non-secular realms of society.  Moreover, the states 
have an undeniably compelling interest in eradicating child abuse and 
prosecuting abusers.  Consequently, amending current mandatory 
reporting statutes to abrogate the clergy-communicant privilege for the 
narrow purpose of reporting suspected abuse would be a 
constitutionally acceptable step toward penetrating the veil of religion 
used to conceal sexual abuse problems within the church.  State 
legislatures and law enforcement officials “must not rely on the church 
to change itself; tragically, victims and their families have already made 
that mistake.”243 
                                                 
242 See supra note 171 (discussing the lasting trauma endured by child abuse victims). 
243 Russell, supra note 38, at 915-16. 
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Think back to the hypothetical scenario from Part I when the parents 
greeted their sixteen-year-old daughter at the airport only to discover 
that she was the unwilling mother of a clergyman’s child.244  By enacting 
a mandatory reporting statute that abrogates the clergy-communicant 
privilege, these parents may now have a viable legal remedy to the grave 
transgression committed against their daughter.  Although nothing can 
fully compensate victims of child abuse, the hope that justice will be 
served and the cycle of abuse broken may bring some relief and healing 
to these children and their families. 
Julie M. Arnold245 
                                                 
244 See supra Part I (presenting a hypothetical illustration of the tragedy and prevalence of 
child sexual abuse within the church). 
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